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for access to capital, as well as the capacity of a government agency like the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to carry out its sensitive mission
in a complex economy. Much is asked of regulators, but regulatory budgets and
resources are severely crimped. How much securities regulation we want
and how much we are willing or able to pay for have become disconnected and
heavily partisan.1
The stress is also technological, played out through increasingly rapid innova-
tion in financial products and financial markets.2 There are countless examples
of technology and innovation upsetting seemingly solid institutional arrange-
ments. Markets are increasingly fragmented and often opaque, even as trans-
parency has become the dominant regulatory objective; new entrants and new
arrangements appear constantly, putting regulators under relentless pressure to
respond. Regulators’ ability to respond well to all this takes us back to the first
form of stress, so that the political and technological stresses are inextricably
linked.
We focus here on the ideologically charged question of when a private
enterprise should be forced to take on public status, an extraordinarily signifi-
cant change in its legal obligations and freedom to maneuver. Our interest was
originally piqued by the publicity surrounding Facebook’s pre-IPO effort to
raise capital while staying outside of the regulatory reach of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In late 2010, reports surfaced that Facebook was
pursuing a deal engineered by Goldman Sachs that would have brought in new
capital from a sizable number of private investors whose interests would be
bundled together in a single investment vehicle.3 Such private placements are
standard, but the bundling was seemingly responsive in part to Facebook’s
desire to limit the number of shareholders of record because it was edging
toward the magic number (500) that at the time would have triggered public
status with its rigorous disclosure, governance, and accountability conse-
quences. Facebook wanted to delay this until it was ready for its planned initial
public offering (IPO) and a stock exchange listing, other steps that trigger 1934
Act obligations. The question was whether the bundling was just a legal artifice
for avoiding a regulatory status to which the company should be subject. The
1. See, e.g., Stacy Kaper, SEC Budget Battle Leaves Enforcement in Jeopardy, NAT’L J. DAILY
(Sept. 15, 2011, 9:30 PM) (“The question of how to make the Securities and Exchange Commission
work better drew very different answers from Republicans and Democrats on Thursday, leaving the
agency’s might in doubt and proving that consensus is still lacking on how to regulate financial
markets.”).
2. There are many different dimensions to this, including the increasing financial complexity of
many kinds of investments and issuers. See Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex To Depict? Innovation, “Pure
Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2012). And to be sure,
this has been happening for quite some time. For an earlier exploration, see Donald C. Langevoort,
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985); for a
more recent look, see Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New
Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339 (2008).
3. See Steven M. Davidoff, Facebook and the 500-Person Threshold, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/facebook-and-the-500-person-threshold/.
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publicity generated by this question in turn endangered the exempt status of the
private placement (under a different portion of the securities laws), so that the
domestic portion of the deal was reportedly called off in favor of an offshore
transaction, free of such requirements.4
Members of Congress responded quickly to Facebook’s dilemma and found
that other high-tech firms had similar misgivings.5 At roughly the same time,
other deregulatory initiatives, such as the promotion of “crowd-funding” and
other kinds of small business capital raising, gained political traction in Con-
gress as well as in the White House. These were all styled as job creation
mechanisms—a particularly potent political label heading into an election
year—and bipartisan momentum grew.6 The product was the so-called JOBS
Act, which became law in April 2012.7 Among many other things, the new
legislation raises the 500-shareholder test to 2,000 so long as no more than 499
of those are not “accredited investors.”8
The 2012 legislation brings new attention to what has been a fairly obscure
but profound legal issue at the public–private regulatory divide. Yet the reforms
were not the product of any coherent theory about the appropriate scope of
securities regulation—not just because of the political dimension but also
because the public–private divide has long been an entirely under theorized
aspect of securities regulation. This is illustrated by the gross inconsistency in
4. See Liz Rappaport, Aaron Lucchetti & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Goldman Limits Facebook Offering,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033966045760879412
10274036.html (“Goldman Sachs Group Inc. slammed the door on U.S. clients hoping to invest in a
private offering of shares in Facebook Inc., because it said the intense media spotlight left the deal in
danger of violating U.S. securities laws.”).
5. A pivotal step here was the demand in March 2011 by Congressman Darrell Issa, chairman of
the House Oversight Committee, that the SEC justify its rules relating to capital formation, particularly
the 500-shareholder metric. See Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 22, 2011), available
at http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/resourcecenter/Issa.041211.pdf.
6. A politically striking feature of the JOBS Act was that the SEC never supported the legislation
and was apparently opposed to much of it. See David S. Hilzenrath, Jobs Act Could Remove Investor
Protections, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro Warns, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/jobs-act-could-open-a-door-to-investment-fraud-sec-chief-says/2012/03/14/
gIQA1vx1BS_story.html. Toward the end of the legislative process, some Senate Democrats took up
the Commission’s concerns but without much effect. So far as Democratic support for the reforms
was concerned, this reflected White House policy, which appeared to differ greatly in its assessment of
the substance of the reforms with the SEC and certain key members of Congress. See Zachary
Goldfarb, Jobs Act: White House, Democrats at Odds over Obama-Backed Pro-Business Bill, WASH.
POST, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/jobs-act-white-house-democrats-
at-odds-over-pro-business-bill-set-to-pass/2012/03/26/gIQAfnq3cS_story.html.
7. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 313 (2012). JOBS is an acronym for “Jumpstart Our Business
Startups.”
8. Accredited investor is a term referring to large, relatively wealthy investors (for example,
institutional investors, persons with an annual income above $200,000 or a net worth of more than
$1 million). Congress also excepted from the count employees of the issuer who received shares
pursuant to an employee compensation plan that was exempt from registration or shareholders who
obtained their shares as part of a crowd-funding transaction. See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying
text.
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how the two main securities statutes—the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Securities Act of 1933—approach this divide. Putting aside the voluntary
acts of listing on an exchange or making a registered public offering, section
12(g) of the 1934 Act has, until 2012, simply counted assets and shareholders to
determine companies subject to reporting and other obligations under the Act.
The 1933 Act, by contrast, uses investor wealth and sophistication—in other
words, investor qualification. The Facebook setting illustrates the difficulty of
working in the shadow of this inconsistency. But these tests are archaic in any
event, legacies of old regulatory (and to some extent judicial) choices. We want
to explore this inconsistency, which takes us quickly to the innovation that is
occurring today in the trading markets for smaller and nonpublic companies. We
can better evaluate what Congress has done in the JOBS Act with a deeper and
more connective understanding of this territory, which is our goal here.
The attention that Congress and the SEC have now given to these subjects
evidences a strong political dimension to finding the right balance between
investor protection and capital formation. Securities regulation has long bal-
anced these two goals, though rarely with much candor as to the trade-offs.
Sometimes these interests coincide—by most accounts, there is a baseline of
regulation that efficiently lowers the cost of capital, benefiting both—but other
times not. We have no problem with making these trade-offs more candid,
which takes us to the task of identifying the costs and benefits associated with
securities regulation. As we explore the terrain along the public–private border,
we will give considerable attention to the difficulties of doing a cost–benefit
analysis, which arise generally because there are so many externalities associ-
ated with regulation—positive and negative—and so many contingencies.9
Indeed, as we will argue, we suspect that some portion of what we call
securities regulation follows from an effort to create more accountability of
large, economically powerful business institutions that is only loosely coupled
with orthodox (and arguably more measurable) notions of investor protection.
This is the more general meaning of the term “publicness”10—what society
demands of powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate. The narrower meaning,
which is our specific focus here, refers to the legal rules that securities law
9. In recent years, the SEC has had a number of its rules successfully challenged because of its
failure to conduct what the court considered a proper cost–benefit analysis. E.g., Business Roundtable
v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Our analysis is sympathetic to the Commission’s
plight, but we leave it to others to evaluate the statutory interpretation and administrative law issues
behind these challenges. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No
Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811
(2012).
10. Publicness as a term has been used in a variety of legal settings, often in the constitutional or
international law context. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative
Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 31 (2009). For a recent article giving the term special prominence in the
context in which we use it here, see Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 138–41 (2011).
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imposes on companies that are deemed public. We argue that, to a greater extent
than generally acknowledged, the broader demands of publicness drive the
creation of contemporary securities regulation, necessarily connecting both the
broad and narrow meanings of publicness.
This understanding leads us to conclude that there should be two key
breakpoints in the 1934 Act. One—the familiar one—is the threshold point at
which companies must undertake basic public disclosure obligations, leaving
behind the privacy they previously had. Congress tinkered with this line in the
JOBS Act but without adequately addressing technological change that has
already rendered parts of the statutory metrics archaic and is quickly reducing
the ability of other parts of the statutory structure to carry out the policy choices
inherent in the public–private divide. To see how and why, Part I of our Article
surveys some of the history of the public–private divide in securities regulation
and then looks at how technology has blurred the distinctions that have long
been used by regulators. Here we look, for example, at the emergence of
SharesPost and SecondMarket as trading markets to facilitate resale of securi-
ties for private companies, as well as changes in what once was known as the
“pink sheets.”
Part II then looks at the Facebook problem and the JOBS Act response. Given
the technological changes covered in Part I, we argue that Congress missed the
real issue when it increased the trigger for a company to have obligations under
the 1934 Act from 500 investors to 2,000 because it continues to base that
number on shareholders “of record,” an archaic metric that has lost its ability to
accurately describe the real number of owners in modern markets;11 a standard
focusing on a company’s trading volume more effectively captures the realities
of the contemporary marketplace. If anything, the result is likely to be a de facto
repeal of section 12(g), rendering the shareholder threshold no longer a binding
constraint in terms of requiring companies to step up to the disclosure and other
obligations of the 1934 Act. This leaves the real work to be done by the other
two statutory thresholds that themselves are being eroded by technological and
market changes. If these developments continue apace, even if not in the
immediate future, there may well be a much larger trading market outside of the
1934 Act obligations that Congress did not consider and the SEC has not yet
planned for. We are also concerned with the idea borrowed by the JOBS Act
from the 1933 Act that accredited, or otherwise sophisticated, wealthy investors
should not be counted in assessing public status for issuers who accrue obliga-
tions under the 1934 Act. Finally, we offer some thoughts about balancing costs
and benefits with respect to drawing the line between public and private issuers.
11. We are not the only ones to come to this conclusion. For other perspectives on the right response,
see Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole from the JOBS Act: How and Why To Rewrite the Rules
That Require Firms To Make Periodic Disclosures, IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (setting out a three-
level approach to companies subject to the federal periodic disclosure requirements); Jeff Schwartz, The
Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2012) (proposing a lifecycle model
in which regulations would adapt to firms as they age).
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There is a second breakpoint that we think should be just as important, and
we turn to it in Part III. Our focus here is on the extent to which Congress has
articulated public company responsibility and accountability with the implicit
image of the large issuer in mind. Many of the modern demands on public
companies are, for reasons having less to do with investor protection as
traditionally imagined and more to do with setting standards to protect constitu-
encies, well beyond their investor base. The implication thus seems clear:
contemporary securities regulation should have two distinct tiers of companies,
with the tier of smaller companies facing only core disclosure obligations and
governance requirements. Full publicness treatment should be reserved for
companies with a larger societal footprint. This shift would, among other things,
ease the costs associated with transition from private to public company. There
is a similarity in purpose here to another innovation of the JOBS Act—the
so-called “on-ramp” initiative12—which provides a useful comparison and con-
trast to the much more expansive idea we advocate.
Part IV discusses the regulatory challenge that arises from rapid technologi-
cal innovation, almost always one step ahead of the regulators.13 Settings like
Facebook—up until the unexpected media coverage—illustrate a process in
which entrepreneurs and their advisors occupy new, unregulated (or less regu-
lated) space created in the wake of technological change or by gaps in regula-
tion revealed as markets evolve. The regulatory response is often piecemeal and
reactive, shaped by the frame that the occupiers have already defined. Overall,
the process is more informal than the administrative process is often described,
relying on staff interpretations more than Commission involvement, for ex-
ample, and sometimes making it difficult to address concepts that may have
become antiquated. We suspect that the JOBS Act will set in motion a new
round of similar occupations.
I. THE CHANGING FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND PUBLIC COMPANIES
The JOBS Act made the first change in the reach of the 1934 Act in almost
fifty years, widening the space within which companies could stay outside the
Act’s regulatory reach and creating a new category of emerging growth compa-
nies that can avoid a number of the Act’s regulatory requirements during the
first years after an IPO if they stay below relatively generous size thresholds. As
12. The on-ramp proposal was the product of work by a private-sector task force that grew out of a
discussion sponsored by the Obama Administration’s Treasury Department; the task force, made up
mostly of professionals working with venture capital-sponsored, emerging growth companies, sought
ways to facilitate IPOs by such companies. See IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP:
PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 4 (2011), available at
http://www.wsgr.com/PDFs/rebuilding-IPO.pdf.
13. Our Article will not attempt to analyze the entirety of the JOBS Act but instead will focus on
public company status under the 1934 Act. We intend to address the 1933 Act issues in a separate paper
as well as other ways—for example, reverse mergers and private investment in public equity (PIPE)
transactions—that entrepreneurs negotiate the public–private divide.
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a prelude to the discussion of those two changes in the next two sections, this
section sets out two necessary foundational points.
Section I.A traces the evolution of the public–private line for purposes of
triggering the obligations under the 1934 Act. This was a three-decades-long
work in progress. Drafting statutory language that could span the different
technology of trading occurring in a physical exchange and trading occurring
over-the-counter between broker-dealers in different places while staying within
the contemporary understanding of the power of the federal government, left a
practical gap that stymied a neat agency or congressional solution for thirty
years. The somewhat jerry-rigged statutory structure that resulted, with three
separate thresholds that triggered coverage—based on exchange trading, a
registered public offering, or the company passing certain size thresholds—
made for a much more complex statutory structure than policy alone would
dictate.
Section II.B develops how technological change in the trading of securities,
which has accelerated in recent years, has exposed real weaknesses in each of
the three existing ways to trigger coverage under the 1934 Act, suggesting that
the search for the line between public and private in contemporary securities
regulation should reach beyond the metrics used in existing statutes.
A. THE PAST
The bifurcation of the core of securities regulation into two separate statutes—
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—was an
accident with unfortunate consequences in terms of regulatory consistency. The
1933 Act governs offerings by issuers (with the assistance of intermediaries like
underwriters and dealers). Congress’s intent was to reach “public offerings,”
evidenced by the seemingly universal reach of the registration requirement for
issuer transactions coupled with an exemption for transactions not involving
any public offering.14 Strangely, however, the Act did not define that central
term that triggers the expansive disclosure requirements (and heavy responsibili-
ties for intermediaries), letting another undefined concept, “distribution,” grow
up as a term of art to bound the coverage of the Act.15 An early SEC release
filled the statutory void, using various indicia of smallness and a close rela-
tionship between the issuer and the offerees to define transactions outside the
reach of the Act.16 In 1953, the Supreme Court’s first entry into the debate
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006) (declaring it unlawful to sell any security through prospectus or
otherwise unless registration statement is effective); id. § 77d(2) (declaring that Section 5 shall not
apply to “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering”). There are other exemptions,
such as the intrastate exemption and those available for small dollar offerings, but publicness defines
the principal transactions that were the focus of the law.
15. See, e.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466–67 (2d Cir. 1959).
16. See Exchange Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (Jan. 24, 1935) (identifying a number
of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the issuers, the number of units offered, the size of
the offering, and the manner of the offering as factors of particular importance).
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declared that offerees who could “fend for themselves” had “no practical need”
for the disclosures and other protections of the Act.17 Subsequent courts debated
whether sophistication, access, disclosure, or relationship was sufficient to
avoid registration, but the reach of the Act remained broad.18
When Congress, in 1934, extended disclosure obligations to protect not just
investors buying stock from an issuer but also investors buying and selling that
same stock on the secondary markets, the statute’s approach reflected a similar
broad reach which was variously described as companies with widely distrib-
uted securities or those when secondary trading was significant.19 These would
be the companies who had this obligation to disclose information quarterly and
annually.
The statute writers in 1934 chose to tie these periodic disclosure obligations
to a company’s decision to list on a national securities exchange.20 There were,
of course, places outside of those exchanges where shares were widely traded—
the most prominent places being the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where
market makers purchased and sold particular stocks. But the exchanges were
tangible, brick-and-mortar institutions well-known to the public, whereas the
OTC markets were more ephemeral for legislators.21 So Congress put the
exchange-listed stocks within the Act and let the new SEC determine what to do
about the OTC stocks.22 Commentators describe the initial choice as driven by
both “practical” and “constitutional” concerns.23 The agency moved slowly,
feeling vulnerable in its first years to a hostile Supreme Court willing to wield a
narrow reading of the Commerce Clause to limit the reach of federal regula-
tion.24 Over the next three decades, there were a variety of unconsummated
17. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
18. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 271–73 (6th ed. 2009)
(discussing case law developments as to access, sophistication, relationship, disclosure, and informa-
tion).
19. See, e.g., Milton Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1341 (1966).
20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1934) (subjecting every issuer of a security registered pursuant
to section 12 to periodic disclosures and proxy regulation). Section 12, in turn, required registration of
securities listed on a stock exchange by prohibiting brokers and dealers from transacting in any security
in an exchange that was not registered. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 12, 48 Stat. 892
(as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)–(b)).
21. An SEC study in 1936 described the over-the-counter markets of the period as “one of the
enigmas of our financial system.” SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE
SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER 78 (1936).
22. 4 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN SECURITIES REGULATION 1746–47 (3d ed. 1990).
23. Id. at 1744. The limits of the original 1934 Act were “not due to any conviction on the part of
Congress that similar safeguards were not equally essential with respect to securities traded in the
over-the-counter market.” Id. Rather the over-the-counter market was “amorphous . . . [and] not a ready
platform.” Id. at 1746–47. As Louis Loss opined, it was “solely for want of a practicable sanction [that]
Congress omitted any reference to registration of securities traded in the over-the-counter market.” Id.
at 1748.
24. Seligman describes the SEC’s policy under Chair James Landis of declining to push a legislative
agenda that would invite Supreme Court invalidation. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE
142–43 (3d ed. 2003).
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agency and legislative efforts to address this regulatory gap.25 Finally, impetus
from one of the periodic stock-exchange scandals and the Special Committee on
Securities Markets led to legislation in 1964 that added section 12(g) to the
1934 Act; this section included a trigger for reporting obligations based on size,
bringing larger OTC stocks within the public realm.26
The long incubation period for the legislation generated a plethora of sugges-
tions for the threshold that should expand public status for disclosure and
related obligations27 but did not produce a theoretical consensus as to how to
define publicness beyond Louis Loss’s odd invocation of Lincoln: that “the
large, publicly held corporations of the nation could not ‘endure permanently
half slave and half free.’”28 Joel Seligman described the ultimate legislation as a
compromise in which the regulators split the difference with the securities
industry,29 requiring periodic disclosure by companies with classes of equity
securities with at least 500 record holders and assets above a certain threshold
(currently set at $10 million).30
The key point to take away from this early period is that, for the first three
decades of federal securities regulation, there was room even for large compa-
nies with widely distributed shares to avoid the periodic disclosure and proxy
obligations of the 1934 Act. So long as their managers could achieve the
companies’ business ends without the liquidity provided by a stock exchange
listing and could obtain necessary capital without resort to public offerings,
companies could avoid the obligations of the 1934 Act.31 Companies chose to
stay dark or to go dark if either of these two economic drivers did not produce
25. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 415; 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 1746–59
(describing legislation proposed in 1941, 1946, 1949, and the mid-1950s).
26. See 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 1761.
27. See SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 312. SEC Chair William O. Douglas advised Roosevelt that the
burden should extend to all companies with $1 million or more in assets. See id. A 1936 statute, the one
legislative change on this subject made in the first three decades after enactment of the 1934 Act,
imposed periodic disclosure obligations based on issuance of public securities (with an out for
companies that later dropped below 300 shareholders of record). 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006). A 1941 bill
that did not pass used a dual trigger of $3 million in assets and 300 security holders (counting both
equity and debt). See 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 1749 (noting recommendations of the two
New York exchanges). Another bill would have reduced the threshold to as low as $500,000 in assets
and ten security holders. See H.R. 7955, 82nd Cong. (1952) (bill introduced by Representative Adolph
Sabath). Other concepts that were suggested included earnings, number of shares outstanding, and
number of shares in public hands. See 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 1759 n.71.
28. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 1758–60 (noting that, “far from being an innovation, this
legislation merely closed an irrational gap in the SEC statutes, while culminating a campaign that had
been waged for at least a half a century on behalf of federal standards for interstate corporations”).
29. See SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 315 (noting that 1,600 firms were removed from the bill’s
coverage as a result of the final compromise, as compared to earlier SEC proposals).
30. See 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 1760.
31. The 1936 addition of § 15(d) to the 1934 Act required companies registering stock under the
1933 Act to make periodic disclosures under the 1934 Act even if they do not have stock listed on a
stock exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
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more benefits than the costs of the regulation under the 1934 Act.32 The result of
the 1964 amendments, which added a third trigger based on size alone, was
regulation of companies even if they had not taken any affirmative steps to list
or issue public securities. Thus, this limited form of issuer choice was lost.
For a time, at least, the 1964 amendments created a strong bias in favor of
public status, precisely given the practical needs of most growing businesses for
both equity capital and liquidity. To be sure, there were historically private
(often family-owned) firms that did not need external financing,33 and the
“going private” phenomenon allowed some public firms to change that status by
buying out a sufficient number of shareholders to fall below the section 12(g)
requirements.34 And there were inevitably smaller firms that did not need the
level of capital or liquidity to bring them to public status. Finally—and of
particular importance here—there were “prepublic” companies that could grow
initially through some combination of family, friends, and occasional private
sources of capital and were willing to accept limited liquidity, waiting to reach a
level of success that would justify going public. These categories, however,
appeared to be distinct exceptions to a legal regime that now presumed a broad
power to require public status of companies simply based on sufficient size.
Growth in and of itself would likely push private companies into the public
domain.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
For our purposes, the category of primary interest from the foregoing discus-
sion is the prepublic company (what, after the JOBS Act, we might call the
“emerging-growth company”). For these firms, the task is to get off the ground
and thrive long enough to justify a public offering that—in return for taking on
public status, with the attendant costs and burdens—would bring enhanced
access to capital and welcome liquidity for those who provided the initial
money and ideas. Two post-1964 developments profoundly changed how this
journey was negotiated.
The first has been well explored in the legal and financial literature. As
technology-driven industries came to dominate innovation in the American
economy, a niche emerged in which an elite group of experts could connect
private sources of capital with the early-stage entrepreneurs who had the best
available ideas. This phenomenon of venture capital created private equity
arrangements in firms poised for high growth trajectories that both deferred the
32. The SEC studied companies that would be affected by the expanded legislation in 1946, 1949
(estimating 1,764 companies would be affected by the bill), and 1955 (estimating an additional 1,500
companies would have to register). See 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 1749–58.
33. See, for example, Cargill Inc., the largest privately held firm today, and Ford Motor Company,
which was privately held until 1956. See generally F. H. O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL &
THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE 1.1 to 1.3 (Rev. 3d ed. 2004).
34. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 11–12 (2009).
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need for public equity and made public financing easier (because of the accom-
panying reputational enhancement) when issuers were ready to take off.35
But although venture capitalists and similar private investors are willing to
tolerate a period of illiquidity, there are limits: venture capitalists require a
reasonable prospect of exit, with an IPO being the most desirable exit mecha-
nism. And, for a variety of reasons that are still not fully understood, the last
decade brought both a drop in the number of IPOs and a lengthening of the time
it has taken venture capital-financed firms to go public.36 As we shall see,
one—but only one—of the likely explanations is hesitancy to assume the
increasing regulatory costs of public status.
This shift in the venture capital exit cycle put all the more stress on liquidity,
because lock-in for too long a period of time is contrary to how the venture
capital industry is structured. It also had a spillover effect on compensation
arrangements with employees of start-up companies who are paid heavily in
stock options. They, too, have an interest in exit that is threatened by the shift to
a longer prepublic status. By the time of the delayed public offering, many
companies will have had larger turnovers of their employee bases and thus more
shareholders who have an interest in liquefying the stock they may have
received in the companies where they are no longer employed.37
That takes us to the second development, which is mostly technological.
Today, liquidity is now much more possible outside of traditional exchanges. In
the new millennium, cheap information and low communication costs have
expanded markets, and SEC regulation has supported alternative trading sys-
tems.38 This environment has broadened the space for active secondary trading
of securities without the usual protections provided by the 1934 or 1933 Acts.39
35. JAY R. RITTER, UNIV. OF FLA., INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: TABLES UPDATED THROUGH 2010, at 1, 3
tbl.4 (2011), available at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2010age052011.pdf.
36. See id. (showing median age at IPO increasing from six to eight years in the early 1980s to ten to
fifteen years in 2008 to 2010); see also Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (discussing decline in IPOs); Jose M. Mendoza & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The “New”
Venture Capital Cycle 2 (Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 1/2011,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1829835. On the legal and
economic evolution of the venture capital industry, see generally Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003).
37. See Felix Salmon, How SecondMarket Works (Apr. 12, 2011), http://blogs/reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2011/04/12/how-secondmarket-works/.
38. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization
of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 369–70 (2002).
39. Technological developments have added stress to the traditional platforms for secondary trading
in this now more active space. Electronic availability of information has facilitated a wider flow of
information at lower costs, and electronic communication has provided new routes to markets for
investors, giving them less reason to use traditional intermediaries such as brick-and-mortar broker-
dealers. As a result there are now fewer broker-dealers overall and, within the set of broker-dealers,
fewer who provide research about smaller portfolio companies as part of their service to clients. FINAL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 65 n.126 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-
finalreport_d.pdf (“[T]he SEC Office of Economic Analysis indicate[s] that in 2004 approximately 52%
of companies with a market capitalization between $125 million and $750 million and 83% of
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In 1964, it could justifiably be said that the world of securities trading was
divided fairly cleanly between the stock exchanges (physical locations for price
discovery and execution) and the OTC markets, which were simply linkages
among broker-dealers that created markets in particular stocks by offering
two-sided quotes on a continuous basis. But all that soon changed. The OTC
linkages evolved into the NASDAQ market, as technological sophistication was
brought to bear with respect to both the real-time display of quotes and the
subsequent execution of orders.40 That eventually led NASDAQ to become an
exchange in and of itself—an important competitor with the established ex-
changes.41 This transformation left open space for trading the stock of issuers
not warranting (or desiring) exchange-like trading; but even here, alternative
electronic trading markets formed for the smaller issuers left behind. Until
1971, quotations on the daily “pink sheets” were the main source for brokers
and dealers who wanted to trade a stock over-the-counter.42 At that point, the
new NASDAQ electronic system permitted brokers to read up-to-the-minute
quotations from desktop terminals.43 In the 1990s, in response to a congressio-
nal directive to the SEC to facilitate dissemination of information regarding
penny stocks, the “OTC Bulletin Board” extended the automated-quotation
system to OTC stocks that were not on NASDAQ.44 Thereafter, Internet sites of
the OTC Markets Group provided Internet-based information for shares previ-
ously followed only in print on the old pink sheets.45
But it would seem that opening up liquidity would inevitably take issuers of
any appreciable size up to the 500-shareholder count and force them into public
status. Here, however, technology came to frustrate the traditional counting
companies with a market capitalization less than $125 million had no analyst coverage.”). Electronic
trading, linked with the move to decimalization, has dramatically driven down spreads (the compensa-
tion a market maker receives for making a market in stocks) over the last two decades. Activity on our
national exchanges today, extraordinary in volume by historical standards, is dominated by high-
frequency trading (HFT) done by computers using algorithms that try to take advantage of minute
differences in information, selling large volumes of shares shortly after buying them. See Concept
Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3,594, 3,606 (Jan.
21, 2010) (estimates of HFT volume are typically fifty percent of total market volume or higher).
40. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 33 (12th ed. 2012) (describing
the development of NASDAQ).
41. NASDAQ Stock Market LLC for Registration as a National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act
Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,550, 3,566 (Jan. 13, 2006).
42. Michael K. Molitor, Will More Sunlight Fade the Pink Sheets? Increasing Public Information
About Non-Reporting Issuers in Quoted Securities, 39 IND. L. REV. 309, 327 (2006) (reporting
inefficiencies caused by brokers having to call one of the dealers listed on the pink sheets to get current
quotations).
43. 5 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2487.
44. See Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation:
Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233, 238 (2005).
45. See Nicolas P.B. Bollen & William G. Christie, Market Microstructure of the Pink Sheets,
33 J. BANKING & FIN. 1326, 1327 (2009); John Jiang et al., Did Stop Signs Stop Investor Trading?
Investor Attention and Liquidity in the Pink Sheets Tiers of the OTC Market (Eli Brood Coll. of Bus.,
Working Paper, Aug. 2012), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract1927295. For recent develop-
ments as to the pink sheets, see Schwartz, supra note 11.
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process. Securities became commonly held in the street names of broker-dealers
that did not require a transfer of certificates every time beneficial ownership
changed.46 The result was a disconnect in the number of record owners (the
finite number of brokerage firms acting as nominees) and the much larger
number of beneficial owners for whom the stock had been purchased, because
high-volume trading demands that securities be held in easily transferrable
form, which did not trigger the kind of “record” ownership commonplace when
trading was in physical certificates.47 That leads us directly to the Facebook
issue—precisely how many shareholders a company has for regulatory purposes
became disconnected from any economic reality and somewhat manipulable
depending on how evidence of ownership was structured.
As a result, trading platforms, such as SecondMarket and SharesPost, emerged
and are said to have handled more than $4.6 billion in private shares transac-
tions in 2010.48 SecondMarket resembles eBay or StubHub in that a seller posts
a willingness to sell, and a buyer agrees to that price, makes a lower offer, or
sets up a meeting to negotiate. The market was strong enough for Facebook
prior to its IPO that there were weekly auctions.49 In these transactions,
SecondMarket employees vetted the buyer to make sure it was accredited and
met the issuer’s approval because there often is a right of first refusal.50 Another
SecondMarket employee ensured compliance with regulations and oversaw
settlement.51 SharesPost began with a somewhat different business model that
focused more on online information sharing but adapted in the face of an SEC
enforcement action in early 2012 that forced it to register as a broker-dealer in
executing trades.52
Because the trading in these privately issued securities can be relatively thin,
both SecondMarket and SharesPost have been concerned with providing a
richer informational environment that would promote fair (and not wildly
volatile) pricing. SharesPost, for instance, developed an index for shares traded
there that aggregates information about not only recent trade prices, but also
46. See DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORP., AN INTRODUCTION TO DTCC: SERVICES AND CAPABILITIES
1 (2009), available at http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/about/Introduction_to_DTCC.pdf (describing
the rise of its street name business as growing out of the back-office crisis of the late 1960s). See
generally 5 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2897–2907 (describing the back-office crisis and how
many brokerage firms could not keep up with the flow of paperwork as trading grew).
47. 2 MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.23 cmt. (4th ed. 2008) (describing the tendency to use the
street-name title for shares).
48. Richard Teitelbaum, Facebook Drives SecondMarket Broking $1 Billion Private Shares,
BLOOMBERG MARKETS MAGAZINE, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011–04–27/facebook-
drives-second (estimating $1 billion of business in 2011 based on first-quarter results). For further
discussions of these two markets (and more recent entrants into the field), see Ibrahim, supra note 36, at
36–39, and Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 36, at 3.
49. Teitelbaum, supra note 48.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. SharesPost, Inc. & Greg Brogger, Exchange Act Release No. 66,594 (Mar. 14, 2012) (order
instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings).
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posted interest in future transactions, valuations reflected in third-party research,
and “premoney” valuations in earlier venture capital rounds for the issuer.53
Although these markets provide trading for private company stock that
previously was difficult to trade, note that the intermediaries are not acting as
traditional market makers in whom they use their own capital to buy from
sellers and then turn around and resell to buyers. The traders have no obligation
to make a market, and in times of stress—for example, when there is a great
imbalance between those who want to sell and those who want to buy—there is
good reason to think this liquidity will vanish.54
These new platforms do provide liquidity, but their impact remains focused
on growth stocks in the technology industries that are not capital intensive.
Thus, none of the fifty stocks traded on SecondMarket as of mid-2011 had
paid dividends, and the firms that were traded did not typically include environ-
mentally friendly “green” firms or similar companies that need large capital
raises.55 These intermediaries act more like brokers for the seller (although
SecondMarket’s 3% to 5% commissions are typically split between the buyer
and the seller); before company shares are posted, the issuing company can
decide how often the stock can trade, whether current employees can buy and
sell (insider trading is a concern driving many companies to prevent current
employees from trading), whether institutions, such as hedge funds, can buy,
and what information about the company will be posted.56
Other platforms have developed for providing liquidity for a variety of fi-
nancial interests such as auction-rate notes, restricted stock, bankruptcy claims,
limited partnership interests, and mortgage-backed Securities (MBS)/Collateral-
ized Debt Obligations (CDOs).57 For example, PORTAL Alliance58 and FBR
Plus59 target the resale market for Rule 144A securities, which are securities
permitted to be sold without registration to Qualified Institutional Buyers
(QIBs), a term defined by the SEC to cover investors who own and invest
$100 million in securities.60
Regulatory changes have also facilitated liquidity outside of an exchange
53. See Mendoza & Vermeulen, supra note 36, at 20.
54. Teitelbaum, supra note 48 (quoting Professor John Coffee) (“These private secondary markets
give the illusion, but not the reality of liquidity. They are matching systems, and the broker does not
function as a dealer committing its own capital. In a period of market distress, liquidity will vanish.”).
55. Salmon, supra note 37.
56. Teitelbaum, supra note 48.
57. See, e.g., Adam Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK. J.
CORP., FIN., & COM. L. 67, 67 (2009).
58. See About the Portal Alliance, PORTAL ALLIANCE, www.portalalliancemarket.com/about_pa_
context.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
59. FBR Capital Markets Launches FBR Plus: An Enhanced Trading Platform for Unregistered
Securities, PR NEWSWIRE (June 27, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fbr-capital-markets-
launches-fbr-plustm-an-enhanced-trading-information-platform-for-unregistered-securities-58514092.
html (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2011). It reduces the need for nonaffiliated investors to seek
registration rights to ensure their ability to sell their stock and also broadens the market for Rule 144A
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listing or a public offering. The 1933 Act’s restriction on resales of restricted
securities that began at three years in the early years of the Act has now shrunk
to one year because of the changes to Rule 144,61 and some exempt securities
(for example, Regulation A) can be resold without restriction.62 With the growth
of these platforms, we again have a situation not unlike the pre-1964 period in
which there are companies with widely traded secondary shares that are outside
of the disclosure and other regulatory requirements of the 1934 Act.63
We do not mean to suggest that technological innovation is a bad thing that
should be chilled. Quite the contrary, investors are often better off because of
the market enhancements that we will be exploring. A good example is the
evolution of the pink sheets—the original and relatively inefficient once-a-day,
paper-based way of disseminating quotes in OTC stocks—which have now
moved onto the Internet.64 The major platform for electronic pink-sheet trading,
OTC Markets Group, has innovated in imaginative ways, including by posting a
vivid “stop sign” icon when issuers cease providing baseline information and
posting a skull and crossbones (and suspending quotes) when there are even
stronger danger signs.65 This seems to have improved the liquidity and fresh-
ened the trading environment and is an example of something that is possible
only because of technological evolution.
II. “PUBLICNESS” UNDER THE 1934 ACT
A company becomes public for purposes of the 1934 Act by one of three
distinct gateways: by making a registered public offering under the 1933 Act
(section 15(d) of the 1934 Act); by listing on a national securities exchange
(section 12(b)); or simply by having enough record shareholders and total
assets (section 12(g)). Each of these standards has been under severe stress as a
result of the technological and marketplace forces described in Part I. In this
Part, we explain why and, more importantly, what that says about rethinking the
standard for public status. We concentrate here on section 12(g), the size
threshold that is best suited to determining when to protect investors in the
trading market. It is also the only one of these affected by the recent legislation
where Congress raised the record shareholder metric from 500 to 2,000, so long
stock, which after one year can be sold by nonaffiliates to buyers other than QIBs. See Samuel Wolff,
Trading Restricted Stock for Private Companies—Part 2, 33 SEC. FED. CORP. L. REP., July 2011.
61. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (2011) (setting a holding period of one year for restricted stock if
there is no public disclosure or six months if there is). We will explore the consequences of this more
fully in a separate paper.
62. Id. §§ 230.251–.263.
63. The provision of the JOBS Act that requires the SEC to provide a new exemption for offerings
up to $50 million also authorizes the agency to provide periodic disclosure, including its financial
condition and corporate governance principles. This permits expansion of 1934 Act regulation to
companies outside of those registered under the 1934 Act. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126
Stat. 306, 323–25 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(4)).
64. See Molitor, supra note 42, at 327.
65. See Jiang et al., supra note 45, at 9–10, 21.
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as most of these are accredited investors (but not counting employees or
“crowd-funders” as shareholders).66
The first gateway, found in section 15(d),67 is ancillary to the issuer’s choice
to raise capital through a registered public offering and is hence bound up with
that distinct phenomenon that is less relevant to a statute seeking to protect
traders in the secondary market. And at the back end, the obligations it imposes
cease upon showing that the company has fewer than 300 record shareholders,
so that the issue of scope and coverage overlaps with the size definition of
publicness.68 The key section 15(d) issue for 1934 Act coverage is the de facto
requirements it imposes for public companies because the 1933 Act registration
process acts as a “rite of passage” by which the company’s system that will
produce the periodic and other disclosures required of a reporting company are
subject to the intense agency review and gatekeeper oversight that is a part of
the 1933 Act requirements. This rite of passage is not just the act of making
disclosure; it is also the process by which teams of lawyers and accountants
engage in clean-up operations to cure any weaknesses that come from what may
be years of operating in a comparatively lax governance and disclosure environ-
ment and prepare the issuer and its management for the demands of more
sustained transparency. This passage includes an eventual negotiation with SEC
staff about how the company will be portrayed in the prospectus and it includes
strict liability for misrepresentations under section 11 of the 1933 Act. This
affects not only the disclosure itself, but the conduct of management, which
knows that, for at least that short time, federal regulators are staring at them and
their handiwork thus far in building the company. The policy question is the
degree to which these should remain as requirements to be a public company.
Many would regard the second gateway, found in section 12(b), as the most
important, but we will say less about it, too.69 To be sure, issuers today often
seek to list their shares on a national securities exchange, which creates public
company status regardless of size. However, the importance of listing and
trading on a national securities exchange is both historically and economically
contingent. Exchanges began as physical locations for traders to make pur-
chases and sales of securities—the idea of securities “listed” for trading fol-
lowed fairly naturally as a way of allocating scarce institutional resources and
66. A slightly different standard is set in the JOBS Act for banks and bank-holding companies. See
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 601, 126 Stat. 306, 326. This is beyond the scope of our paper, and
reflects a long-standing inclination to relax securities regulation in the context of otherwise fairly
intense banking law.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006). A company brought into the 1934 Act by § 15(d) faces the
obligations of periodic disclosure and internal controls, but not the proxy requirements or section 16
reporting obligations.
68. Id.
69. Section 12(a) makes it unlawful for any broker-dealer to effect a transaction in any security
on a national securities exchange unless the security is registered on that exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)
(“[U]nless a registration statement is effective . . . .”). Section 12(b) then creates the process for the
issuer to register a security by filing certain information (Form 10) with the Commission. Id. § 78l(b).
352 [Vol. 101:337THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
specialized knowledge to certain stocks, thereby attracting order flow. At a time
when securities regulation had not yet come to exist, listings were a means of
signaling quality to potential traders. Exchanges that could afford to be more
exclusive in determining whether a stock qualified for trading created a brand
that was to the benefit of both the exchange and the listed company. Exchange
listing standards grew out of this form of branding.70
Today, as we have seen, exchanges themselves play a diminished role in
providing liquidity in the securities marketplace—though it is still big. This is
because, even though the statutory definition of an exchange is fairly broad,71
the SEC has deliberately encouraged the growth of trading facilities that do not
have to bear the burdens of registration as a national securities exchange.72
In today’s fragmented trading world, where shares of a reporting company
are traded in multiple platforms beyond traditional exchanges,73 it makes little
sense to make public company regulation turn on whether an issuer is listed on
an exchange unless (a) we are prepared to reverse course and insist that all
significant trading platforms be deemed national securities exchanges or (b) we
want to make public company status elective through issuer choice to pursue a
listing. Our sense is that the idea of a listing is becoming anachronistic as a
result of this evolution. Listings were once a means by which exchanges sought
near-exclusive rights to trading in a particular security, from which they would
profit in terms of both listing fees and the income from the order flow.74 In
return, exchanges could be expected to offer some quality assurance with
respect to listed companies, particularly in the time prior to federal securities
regulation. Today, however, neither exchanges nor competitive trading plat-
forms can capture more than a portion of the order flow, and new entrants
continue to threaten even that.75
70. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765 (2002).
On how this has come to generate a transnational system of legal obligations, see Chris Brummer, Stock
Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2008).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1).
72. See Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation
Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 765–66 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey &
Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 18 (1999); Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell
Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866
(2008).
73. See Special Study Grp. of the Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Bus.
Law, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW.
1489, 1492 (2002) (addressing the then-recent evolution of the securities marketplace, including market
fragmentation caused by the proliferation of automated trading systems and internationalization).
74. See Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees and
Listing Requirements, 11 J. FIN. INTERMED. 297, 298 (2002).
75. Just from 2005 to 2009, the NYSE’s share of trading in listed stocks declined from around eighty
percent to twenty-five percent. See SEC Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,358, 17 C.F.R. § 242 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34–
61358.pdf.
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As a result, we are not convinced that section 12(b) will remain a particularly
robust test for public company status for long. As an alternative to a size test,
however, it does little harm and may remain a useful mechanism by which
certain issuers (for example, foreign ones) might voluntarily assume U.S.
disclosure obligations.76 But we suspect that section 12(g), the third gateway,
will increasingly bear more of the load with respect to answering the hard
questions about the public–private divide, and so we turn to it for the remainder
of this section.77 In section A, we explore the market changes since 1964 that
make section 12(g)’s reliance on record shareholders problematic; in its place
we believe a metric like average daily trading volume would work far better in
76. Listing provides an ancillary benefit for certain foreign issuers who choose to list on a national
securities exchange in the United States, likely seeking to signal to investors that they adhere to
disclosure and disclosure-related corporate governance responsibilities that are more stringent than
those in their home countries—the “bonding” hypothesis. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 1770–71
(explaining that the number of foreign companies listed on the two principal U.S. stock markets grew
from 170 in 1990 to more than 750 in 2000). Such cross-listings have dropped in frequency over the
last decade, which has been one of the trigger points to the debate over whether U.S. markets are losing
their competitive appeal because of over regulation. See Steven M. Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A
Historical Perspective on the Regulation of Foreign Private Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619, 628 (2010)
(“In the wake of the technology bubble and the accompanying worldwide recession, companies stopped
cross-listing and engaging in initial public offerings.”). We do not rehash that debate here. See, e.g.,
Craig Doidge et al., Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?, 65 J. FIN. 1507, 1508, 1528
(2010) (suggesting most of the reduction is because other countries have gotten better at offering
investor protection with respect to both trading markets and issuer disclosure as well as providing
evidence that some of the desire to avoid U.S. listings is driven by large block-holders who are seeking
to preserve the private benefits of control).
Within a discussion of determining metrics for publicness, this issue seems of lesser importance and
ought not to deter a move away from listings as a focus for publicness. The SEC’s budget is notoriously
thin, so it has to allocate its own resources carefully. Policing foreign issuers is difficult (travel,
language barriers, home country barriers to cooperation, etc.), and it is hard to see how or why the SEC
would undertake this task if the consequence is to lessen the attention given to domestic issuers (and
other tasks of securities regulation) where there is proportionately greater U.S. investor interest. The
primary economic benefit of cross-listing goes not to the SEC itself, but to the exchanges where the
listing occurs, with some spillover to the Wall Street community. With exchanges being publicly owned
and those shareholders having a global footprint, the disconnect with costs borne by domestic taxpayers
becomes more noticeable. What little empirical evidence there is suggests that the SEC quietly devotes
less than a proportionate share of resources to foreign issuers, in which case the economic value of
bonding is less than advertised. See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by
Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 335–43 (2005); Natalya Shnitser, Note, A Free
Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers,
119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1658 (2010) (“[T]he single empirical study on specific treatment of foreign firms
suggests that the SEC has rarely taken action against crosslisted firms or their insiders for violations of
the federal securities laws, even when well-publicized misconduct has taken place.”).
77. In recent years both Congress and the SEC have relied heavily on listing standards, particularly
in the Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank Acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-4(b), -1(m), -3 (2006) (prohibiting
listing if no policy for claw backs from executive officers after accounting restatement and requiring all
audit or compensation committee members to be independent); id. § 78j-1(m) (directing national
securities exchanges to prohibit listing of companies where each member of audit committee is not
independent); id. § 78j-3 (directing national securities exchanges to prohibit listing of companies where
each member of compensation committee is not independent). Limiting obligations to a subset of listed
companies traded on exchanges may be an indirect way of “tiering” public company obligations, but in
our view, explained more fully below, such separation should be more careful and thought out than this.
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gauging the extent of investor interest in, and need for, disclosure. In section B,
we broaden the discussion to examine how best to think about the threshold,
whichever metric is used. Here, we consider the JOBS Act’s importation of the
“accredited investor” concept from the 1933 Act in counting the number of
shareholders, a choice that we believe has less utility given the policies of the
1934 Act. We also examine what existing data tell us about doing a cost–benefit
analysis in that context.
A. SECTION 12(G): THE SIZE TEST
As we have seen, section 12(g) was added to the 1934 Act in 1964, partly
because of the availability of nonexchange (that is, over-the-counter) stocks to
retail investors in the trading market not subject to the reporting obligations of
the Act.78 In the pre-1964 period, investors trading in these stocks could
participate in the riskier end of the investing continuum, for which they would
expect bigger payoffs if the investments turned out well. Brokers and promoters
were quite active in pushing low priced speculative OTC stocks.79
Because the OTC market was simply a network of dealers posting quotes in
securities in which they were making markets, there was no institutional
infrastructure to which to refer when Congress decided to expand the definition
of public company—hence, the size test. The 500-or-more-shareholder-of-
record metric stayed the same over time until the JOBS Act;80 the conjunctive
$10-million-in-asset figure is the product of SEC exemptive relief, raising the
original 1964 threshold of $1 million.81 While roughly a size test, it is not
really: as the Facebook example and the world of private equity show, many
extraordinarily large and powerful companies have few enough record sharehold-
ers to avoid registration.82
The dysfunction here comes from the reference to “record” ownership. The
term necessarily invites a distinction between the record owner and someone
else who has the real economic interest in the shares. If there are multiple
beneficial economic owners for one or more record owners, the potential
difficulty in applying a consistent statutory policy regarding the threshold for
regulation under the 1934 Act based on the number of shareholders becomes
manifest. Two contexts are of particular concern. First, nominee accounts by
which title to the securities is held in the name of broker-dealers or their
designated depository agent have become ubiquitous for practical reasons as the
78. SEC, supra note 21, at 66–67 (“Even with respect to some common stocks admitted to exchange
trading, the volume of trading over the counter frequently exceeds that on the exchange.”).
79. Id. at 76.
80. There was a two-year phase-in period during which only companies with 750 or more sharehold-
ers of record had to meet the obligations of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g).
81. The amount was increased to $3 million in 1982, $5 million in 1986, and $10 million in 1996.
See Relief From Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 37,157, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,354,
21,354 (May 9, 1996).
82. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 33, at 11.
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preferred method for holding title to securities in publicly held companies;
physical transfer of securities is no longer necessary when stock is sold, just an
electronic transfer in the records of the title holder. Second, entities such as
corporations, limited liability companies, or trusts can aggregate the funds of
multiple investors with title in the name of the entity. The Facebook example
flows from this second branch of the analysis.
The first context is much more visible but turns out to have less of a practical
disruption on the application of the threshold for regulation. Since 1964, there
has been a massive change in the practice of how title to stock is held for
individual owners. No longer are shares recorded in the name of individual
owners, as was usually still the case in 1964. Instead, for exchange-listed
companies, broker-dealers (or banks) hold vast numbers of shares of vast
numbers of investors under a single name. Realistically, this practice developed
as a response to the back-office crisis created by the massive flow of paper and
the costs of transferring stock as the volume of trading accelerated in a time
before electronic transfers were common.83
SEC rules, unchanged on this point since the promulgation of what is now
Rule 12g5-1 shortly after the enactment of the 1964 statute, fail to account for
this development.84 The language initially proposed for the rule would have
counted owners by looking through the title held in the name of a nominee
broker-dealer or bank to get to the customers who hold the real economic
interest,85 but the final rule omitted such language and SEC interpretations
make clear that a look through is not required (even though other SEC rules do
provide for a look through in other circumstances).86 The absence of a look
through widens the range of trading that can occur without 1934 Act regulation
because beneficial owners can, and do, make individual decisions to sell their
stock, so that one broker-dealer as record owner may reflect the reality of
hundreds of investors trading. The disparity between the number of record and
beneficial owners has not caused a significant disruption in the application of
the statute, however, because the separation of ownership status practically
takes place only after a company goes public.87 Until a company goes public,
83. See LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 486 (2d ed. 1988) (noting the steps
taken by the securities industry to immobilize certificates in depositories in “an attempt to cope with the
burgeoning paperwork problem” that “greatly increased the proportion of shares held in the names of
nominees”); see also 6 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 2959 (describing securities immobilization).
84. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1 (2011) (defining securities “held of record” by a corporation, a
partnership, a trust, or other organization as “so held by one person”).
85. See “Held of Record” and “Total Assets” Proposed Definitions, Exchange Act Release No.
34-7426, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,487, 13,488 (Sept. 29, 1964).
86. Exchange Act Rules Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations §§ 152, 252.01 (Sept. 30, 2008).
Rule 12h-6, relating to foreign issuers, and Rule 405, defining foreign private issuer, do contain a look
through as does Rule 12g3-2(a). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12g3-2, 240.12h-6.
87. Companies must apply for book-entry trading status of their shares. The guidelines of the
Depository Trust Company (DTC), which provides this service, specify that this status is available to
firms with securities registered under the 1933 Act; with exempt securities, if there are no transfer
restrictions; or firms with securities issued under Rule 144A. See DEPOSITORY TRUST CO., OPERATIONAL
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there has not been the same practical need to use nominee shares, so this
disparity has only occurred in the shadow of companies that already are subject
to public status, and rules to leave such status have been sufficiently sticky that
the question of broker-dealer nominee accounts causing companies to fall
before the statutory threshold has not frequently arisen.88
The use of a legal entity to “bundle” multiple investors has likewise been
part of the “counting” discussion since 1964, but with recent developments
adding stress not previously visible.89 Since its inception, Rule 12g5-1 has
provided that securities held of record by a corporation, partnership, trust, or
other organization shall be counted as one record owner.90 Indeed, many
institutional investors are collectives of individual economic investors—for
example, mutual funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds, many of
which invest in pre-IPO companies—and there has been little question that their
ownership interest is that of a single shareholder. At the same time, Rule 12g5-1
contains a broad anti-evasion clause ((b)(3)) that deems each beneficial owner
to be a record owner if the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of
holding securities of record is used primarily to circumvent the minimum
shareholder count.91
The Facebook deal with Goldman Sachs hit at the intersection of these two
concepts. If Goldman Sachs created a single record-holder entity to invest in
Facebook, with a thousand participating investors (all presumably wealthy and
sophisticated), would this be one extra Facebook shareholder or a circumven-
tion?92 And precisely the same process seemed to be occurring in connection
with the emergence of SecondMarket and SharesPost. SharesPost, for instance,
had an affiliate that created limited liability companies formed solely to hold
shares in private companies traded there (for example, Facebook).93 Buyers
who wanted Facebook would be able to buy interests in the LLC, instead of
buying Facebook directly.94 Thus, substantial demand could be accommodated
without enlarging Facebook’s shareholder base by more than one.95
ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR AN ISSUE TO BECOME AND REMAIN ELIGIBLE FOR DTC SERVICES 2 (2012),
available at http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/legal/rules_proc/eligibility/operational.arrangements.
memo.pdf. Practically, we have been told by those in the industry that, if there are enough broker-
dealers who want book-entry transfers, this service is available, which opens up the possibility, at least,
that record ownership will diverge from beneficial ownership in the prepublic period as well.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(4) (2006) (providing that registration is terminated when record sharehold-
ers reduced to fewer than 300 shareholders). That is not to say that it could not arise, of course. If so, it
would raise the question of the anti-evasion clause of Rule 12g5-1(b)(3) discussed below.
89. See supra text accompanying note 3.
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1(a)(2).
91. Id. § 240.12g5-1(b)(3).
92. Of course this is not just a section 12(g) issue. The deal would have to be structured to avoid
other regulatory obstacles, most importantly to ensure that Facebook would not make an unregistered
public offering of its securities under the 1933 Act.
93. See SharesPost, Inc. & Brogger, supra note 52, at *4.
94. See id.
95. See id. At the same time as the enforcement action against SharesPost, the SEC brought an
antifraud action against a promoter (unaffiliated with either marketplace) involved in the creation of
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The legal background for this discussion is undeveloped. In the half century
since the rule and its anticircumvention exception were put in place, there has
been one clear-cut judicial application to a long-standing family business that
resembled a voting trust, a context unlikely to provide much guidance to the
Facebook example.96
The Facebook hypothetical has some elements of the pure nominee status
discussed above. It differs from the mutual funds and venture funds that have
traditionally been thought to come under the corporate exemption where the
focus is on one security. To the extent that there is a market for the shares in this
fund, either through a SecondMarket/SharesPost type of trading platform or by
Goldman Sachs agreeing to make its own market in this fund, there will be
investors who seek to participate in secondary trading as to Facebook. Assume
that Facebook were to do the same thing with two other investment banks. If all
this were to work, Facebook could raise a massive amount of capital and bring
in thousands of indirect shareholders—and yet only add three record sharehold-
several Facebook “bundles.” See Laurence Albukerk and EB Financial Group, LLC, Exchange Act
Release No. 3383, 2012 WL 1023978 (Mar. 14, 2012).
96. Tankersley v. Albright, 514 F.2d 956, 969–70 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding a formal trust for
employees created prior to the adoption of Rule 12g5–1 and “clearly serv[ing] other important
purposes” was not a device to avoid the holder of record threshold). Litigation over control of the
Bacardi Corporation raised the circumvention problem, without clear-cut guidance. See Bacardi v.
Bacardi Corp., [1987–88 Tr. Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,712 (D. Del. 1988). For the SEC’s
view, see Bacardi Corp., [1989–90 Tr. Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,515 (Admin. Proc. 1990).
In 1975, a privately held company in Wisconsin requested interpretation on whether its retirement trust
would destroy its nonreporting status under section 12(g). See H.C. Prange Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
1975 WL 10006, at *1 (May 30, 1975). The company held assets of over $1 million and had issued
multiple shares of a single common stock held “of record” by 224 shareholders. Id. The company’s
retirement trust consisted of 188 participants, but the company planned to revise the trust, making it
available to more than 500 employees. Id. at *2. Under the previous trust, each participant had limited
voting rights. Id. Concerned that allowing more than 500 employees voting rights would amount to
“circumvention” under Rule 12g5-1, the company limited participants’ voting rights such that they
could only direct the trustee on how to vote. Id. The SEC initially responded that allowing participants
voting rights in any form—even if only through a trustee—may constitute circumvention. Id. at *4. The
company then asked the SEC to reconsider its initial decision, citing to the legislative history of section
12(g). See H.C. Prange Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13,118, at *4–5 (Feb. 20, 1978).
Congress’s main concern in enacting section 12(g), according to the company, was to balance two
interests: the need to prevent companies from raising large sums of capital through public trading
without the discipline of the disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act and the freedom that closely
held companies needed to self-manage without the costs associated with disclosure. Id. The company
further noted that certain factors that Congress specifically contemplated as being indicative of
circumvention—such as the large number of record transfers among shareholders and corresponding
single holders of records as well as broker-dealer marketing aimed at shareholders—were not present in
the trust. Id. The SEC thus revised its position, concluding that the shares “held of record” by the
revised trust may be counted as being “held of record by one person” under section 12(g). Id. at *6.
The SEC staff, in a report mandated by the JOBS Act, concluded that “current tools available to the
Commission are adequate to enforce the anti-evasion provisions of Rule 12g5-1” in an era where the
increase in the section 12(g) threshold may reduce the motivation to engage in circumvention efforts.
See SEC, REPORT ON AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE EXCHANGE ACT RULE 12g5-1 AND SUBSECTION (b)(3), at
33–34 (2012) [hereinafter SEC, AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2012/authority-to-enforce-rule-12g5-1.pdf.
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ers. That roadmap would surely be tempting to many emerging growth compa-
nies who desire not to be 1934 Act registrants.
How would this fund seek to defuse a claim that it was merely an indirect
economic interest in its portfolio company and make itself more like the mutual
fund or venture capital funds? Those funds, besides having a more diversified
portfolio, have separate professional management that provides investment
expertise as well as the economic interest. Assume that the Facebook entity was
structured so that there was a professional manager (or elected committee of
investors) who would own the shares and otherwise act on behalf of the
investors. That solves an otherwise common collective-action and coordination
problem, making the form of shareholding more potent—something akin to a
voting trust. It may not be a simple circumvention of section 12(g) because
there is some economic value added by the delegated ownership structure. But,
if that is all it takes to avoid the anticircumvention rule, then it is not much of an
obstacle.
Given the contemporary setting, the application of the (b)(3) anti-evasion
clause would have to take on a more nuanced and complex structure, including
consideration of the number of portfolio investments, the range of management
services provided, the secondary market that is available, the degree of trading
on that market, and the life cycle of the company. The Facebook example, if it
were a one-portfolio special-purpose vehicle (SPV) whose shares would be
widely traded in circumstances where the company was interested in postponing
its move to public regulation, would seem a likely case for application of the
anticircumvention clause of (b)(3). And that is pretty much what we believe was
happening.
But there is uncertainty about this. For now, note that bundling seems to
have emerged in private spaces, maybe over quite a period of time, with the
SEC either letting it happen or being oblivious to it. We see this as a theme in
technology-driven markets, which regularly create such opportunities that are
filled before the SEC can respond. We will comment more on this in the
conclusion.
Would we get a result that was more consistent and easier to apply by moving
to another concept for measuring publicness?97 We face two questions here.98
The first may be the easier: is there an objective test for publicness that is better
than the record ownership standard and usable in the real world? The second,
explored in the next subsection, derives from the first and is much harder: how
and where should we draw the line between public companies and nonpublic
companies for 1934 Act purposes? Even if we were to stick with record
97. The rule presumably could be modified to refer to beneficial ownership known or reasonably
available to the issuer. See SEC, ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUB. COS., FINAL REPORT 76–80 (2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport_d.pdf (proposing amendment to
Rule 12g5-1 to interpret “held of record” to mean held by actual beneficial holders).
98. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 43 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Second-Sjostrom-Online-Article1.pdf.
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shareholders, how would we know whether the right number is 500, 2,000, or
more (or fewer)? If—as seems likely—there is a better test than record owner-
ship, how would we go about finding the right tipping point to trigger public
company status?
As to the first question, history is a useful guide. As noted earlier in Part II,
the record shareholder test is used both at the front end (the duty to register) and
back end (the ability to deregister) of public company status.99 Foreign com-
panies who came into the system via section 12(b) or 15(d)—listing on an
exchange or making a registered public offering in the United States—were
entitled to exit if they could establish that they had fewer than 300 U.S.
shareholders.100 But nominee ownership (and the burden of making a showing
being put on the issuer) did not allow for confident assessments of the national-
ity of the shareholder, making counting difficult. Hence, there was a lock-in
effect, which the stock exchanges and others came to believe was discouraging
foreign issuers from coming to the United States in the first place.101 In 2004,
the SEC revised Rule 12h-6 to make it easier for foreign issuers to deregister.102
One of the solutions was to substitute a trading volume test: if the foreign issuer
can show that the average daily trading volume in the United States over a
twelve-month period was less than 5% of the average world-wide trading
volume, it can leave.103 As anticipated, many foreign issuers left as soon as the
rule became effective, taking prompt advantage of the usability of the new
standard.104
Exit and entry are different issues (as is the treatment of foreign issuers), but
our sense is that a metric like average daily trading volume captures, in
principle, far better than number of record shareholders the purpose for 1934
Act registration, gauging the extent of investor interest in and need for disclo-
sure. Of course this depends on there being accurate reporting of trade activity
along the full spectrum of fragmented markets in the United States, but that has
long been the goal, at least, of SEC market regulation.105
99. For a useful discussion of this deregistration process as applied to domestic issuers, containing a
critique of the record ownership test, see Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135
(2009).
100. See Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities Under
Section 12(g) and Duty To File Reports Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Exchange Act Release No. 55,540, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,934, 16,953 (Apr. 5, 2007).
101. See id.
102. This revision reduced the value of the bonding in the first place. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-6
(2011); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as a Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 684 (2002) (discussing the deregistration process for
foreign issuers before 2004); see also Nuno Fernandes et al., Escape from New York: The Market
Impact of Loosening Disclosure Requirements, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 129 (2010) (discussing the negative
market impact on firms subject to escape).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-6.
104. Samuel Wolff & Clarence D. Long IV, Post-Sox Trends in Delistings and Deregistration,
9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 53, 55 (2010).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 242.302(b) (requiring an alternative trading system to records including daily
summaries of trading covering securities for which transactions have been executed and transaction
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A few issues might seem bothersome here. One has to do with variability.
Manipulative trading happens most frequently with small issuers: trading spikes
only briefly while the “pump and dump” is in process, and then it diminishes.106
These situations might push daily volume over the threshold for a while but not
long enough to require registration and reporting—which would come too late
anyway. But we regard manipulation as a securities trader/broker-dealer issue,
for which there are other forms of regulation and remedies. Our view is that
registration is meant for situations where there is sustained investor attention in
the company. More of a concern is if a company sought to suppress average
trading volume over the applicable period of time, but that standard seems less
manipulable than the number of record owners on one day a year.107
B. HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE THRESHOLD FOR REGISTRATION
The original 500-record-shareholder/$1-million-in-assets standard in section
12(g) (chosen in 1964) was arbitrary; as we saw earlier in section II.A, other
numbers were considered contemporaneously, and there is no explanation for
how we would know that 500, or some larger asset size, is the right tipping
point. Most all of securities regulation is educated guesswork rather than
rigorous cost–benefit analysis because we lack the ability to capture the full
range of possible costs or benefits with anything remotely resembling precision.
That opens the door to bias—whether the influence of deliberate rent seeking,
ideological preferences, or just preconceived (and unfalsifiable) notions—on the
part of the many actors who contribute to the process of policy formulation. But
this is inevitable.
That, however, does not mean there is no rational basis from which to
estimate, at least roughly, the effect of either a policy change or the status
quo—there is by now a great deal of both theoretical and empirical work on
volume, expressed with respect to equity securities in number of trades, number of shares traded, and
total settlement value in terms of U.S. dollars). Filings are required within thirty days of the end of each
quarter. Id. § 242.301(b)(9). These records are not available to the public. Regulation of Exchanges and
Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,914 (Dec. 22,
1998).
106. The “pump and dump” term refers to schemes to tout the stock of companies, often small, in an
effort to create a buying frenzy and raise the price, so the instigator can sell all his stock, often causing
the price to decline afterwards. See Pump and Dump Schemes, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/pump
dump.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012); see also Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Guojun Wu, Stock Market
Manipulations, 79 J. BUS. 1915, 1936 (2006) (finding most manipulation cases occur in small and
illiquid markets).
107. An alternative to trading volume would be the issuer’s public float, that is, its total market
capitalization in the hands of nonaffiliates. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While
Protecting Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Dev., 112th Cong.
13 (Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of John C. Coffee), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseActionFiles.View&FileStore_idd580503c-a7f3–4db5-b9f5–968d03af374f. This, how-
ever, would require a great deal of confidence in the valuation process for thinly traded securities and
no doubt would be subject to considerable volatility. It might also be possible to have companies
estimate the number of beneficial owners from certain indicators—such as how many proxy ballots and
annual reports they are asked to prepare in connection with an election of directors.
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financial reporting to help frame any inquiry and pose useful questions.108
Asking any more of cost–benefit analysis to justify regulation itself displays a
bias, or a presumption against the desirability of regulation. That might be
sound—certainly the presumption has many adherents109—but it is by no means
self-evident and can easily become a normative cover for lobbying in favor of
deregulation that is purely self-serving. In this vein, there are two policy
questions that we consider here: one that focuses on whether an investor’s
qualitative characteristics should be part of the standard, and a second that
addresses how to assess costs and benefits no matter which metric is chosen.
1. Qualified Investors
The first question brings to light a profound difference in philosophy between
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The latter, as we saw in section II.A, uses issuer size as
the default standard, without much interest (at least prior to the JOBS Act) in
whom the shareholders might be. The JOBS Act moves the 1934 Act in this
direction by permitting a larger, but not unlimited, number of accredited inves-
tors before triggering 1934 Act responsibilities, yet that legislation produced no
public debate on the point or its theoretical justifications. By contrast, the 1933
Act depends crucially on an assessment of whether investors can be expected to
“fend for themselves”110 and hence gets into questions of offeree sophistication,
wealth, and access to information before deciding that the regulation is needed
at all. In a world where we try to integrate the two statutes, does such a
difference make sense?111
The Facebook plan poses the question quite clearly. Assuming that all the
investors in the entity formed to hold the shares were able to “fend for
themselves,” why should it matter whether there are one, one thousand, or
one million such investors? Arguably, if a private equity arrangement permits a
company to go or stay dark, this plan should too. We can address this in two
ways. The first is to question the 1933 Act assumption—if we really do not have
enough confidence in supposedly sophisticated investors fending for them-
selves, then simply counting might be preferable under both statutes. The
second is to ask whether there are differences in the purposes of the two statutes
to justify the disparate treatment.
As to the first, we have plenty of anecdotal evidence of institutional and
wealthy individual investors fending for themselves poorly.112 Ponzi schemes
108. For a thorough survey of the recent financial economics literature on both mandatory and
voluntary financial reporting, see Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: A Review of
the Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296 (2010).
109. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regula-
tion, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
110. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
111. For a discussion and proposal that makes much of the distinction, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 639 (2009).
112. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2009).
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can be successful in a regulatory vacuum, and the 2008 financial meltdown
shows institutional purchasing behavior that was woefully insensitive to the
embedded risk. Aspects of the Dodd–Frank Act (for example, the asset-backed
securitization reforms and hedge-fund adviser regulation) at least implicitly call
into question the disclosure and other customer protections in the offering
process even where the offerings are unregulated.113 If the question is whether
we can count on large or wealthy investors to act prudently, the answer is surely
no. But, in our view, this does not fully capture the fend-for-themselves
exemptions. Instead, it reflects a broader principle that, in a world of thin
regulatory resources, larger and relatively more sophisticated investors are
lower priority. They will sometimes protect themselves, and in many situations
where investments are standardized, the presence of some prudent buyers will
redound to the benefit of the less prudent. And even when an investment goes
awry, large investors by and large have reasonable access to legal remedies for
fraud or negligent misrepresentation, albeit subject to fairly potent “reasonable
reliance” defenses.114 Moreover, even when all else fails, they are less likely to
suffer severely from any particular issuer-specific wrongdoing because their
portfolios are larger and more diversified.
Of course, there will be instances to the contrary—the Madoff scandal,
perhaps, or the massive losses suffered by smaller public retirement funds from
buying complex derivatives before the onset of the global financial crisis.115 But
even here, we suspect that the primary problems go more to the sales practices
in the securities industry than the registration and disclosure rules themselves,
so that, if there are cost-justified solutions, they will more likely be found in
broker-dealer and investment-adviser regulation than corporate disclosure re-
forms.
The remaining question is whether there is something in the purposes behind
the issuer registration regime that counsels against extending the private-issuer
exemption (regardless of number of shareholders) to an arrangement like our
hypothetical Facebook deal. The crucial difference between the 1933 and 1934
Acts is that the former deals mostly with primary offerings of securities by the
issuer, as opposed to secondary trading among investors. Fending for oneself is
easier when the investor is in privity or near privity with the issuer because
representations and warranties can be extracted fairly directly; in aftermarket
trading, by contrast, the link between issuer and investor is broken. Arguably,
113. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403,
124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3) (eliminating hedge fund
exemption); 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c), (d) (2006) (requiring registration statements and disclosure for
asset-backed securities).
114. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1027–31 (4th Cir.
1997) (rejecting bank’s claim against investment bank for misleading it about the risk in collateralized
mortgage obligation).
115. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges RBC Capital Markets in Sale of Unsuitable CDO
Investments to Wisconsin School Districts, Rel. 2011-191 (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2011/2011–191.htm.
2013] 363“PUBLICNESS” IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITIES REGULATION
this is one reason the SEC was so restrictive in authorizing the more deregulated
144A marketplace, choosing to authorize free resales of privately placed securi-
ties but only among large institutions—not among all accredited investors.116
However, this concern may be overstated. There are many examples in
private, negotiated transactions where the issuer commits to ongoing disclosure—
including, sometimes, the contractual obligation to be a “voluntary filer,” so that
reporting occurs as per SEC rules, even though the issuer is not required by
securities law to do so. It has been pointed out that “going dark” may actually
be a less troublesome phenomenon than assumed, precisely because the deals
that take issuers out of the public realm often have such covenants.117 Some
investors will be willing to take on the additional risk from high volatility, for
example, because they expect higher returns for that risk. The bigger point is
that disclosure and corporate governance (including market constraints and the
impact of various gatekeepers) are often substitutes. Required disclosure is
more valuable (and necessary) in the presence of dispersed shareholdings facing
a collective-action problem. If we believe that corporate governance is likely to
be relatively strong because of the way these arrangements would be structured—
again, imagine some kind of centralized voting arrangements—we could plausi-
bly conclude that mandated disclosure is inefficient.
On the other hand, if we have doubts about collective action as the number of
investors grows—even assuming wealth or sophistication—the case for manda-
tory periodic disclosure strengthens. In the face of dispersion, both shareholders
and potential investors have to glean information on their own to compensate
for any lack of voluntary disclosure, which produces inefficient duplication of
effort.118 Here, a disclosure regime makes sense, although we have to balance
this benefit against the risk that government-mandated disclosure will turn out
not to be cost efficient.
So far, however, this discussion has assumed that efficient disclosure is
simply a matter of bargaining between shareholders (current and potential)
and management for the benefit of the former. But both the theory and practice
of public-company disclosure emphasize that the externalities associated with
disclosure are as important, maybe more so. The orthodox economic case for
disclosure is that the benefits are captured by a host of constituencies—
including the economy generally, in terms of efficient allocation of capital
among companies.119 Competitors and peer companies benefit from one anoth-
116. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2011).
117. Bartlett, supra note 34, at 9 (noting that “firms going private frequently remain subject to
[Sarbanes–Oxley’s] compliance costs owing to the fundamental need to finance a going-private
transaction” via publicly held debt).
118. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 281
(1991) (“When investors spend time and resources inspecting, each one’s effort will duplicate what
another has done.”).
119. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1379 (1999); see also Michael Guttentag, Imposing
Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 133–38 (2004).
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er’s performance data, which is socially valuable so long as disclosure does not
create an undue disincentive to productive activity. There may be more diffuse
social value to transparency as well, an argument we develop in the next Part.
So, the argument goes, there will be too little disclosure if the matter is left
simply to management and shareholders. Disclosure is a public good.120
To be sure, this point is not so compelling that we prohibit large companies
from being private; public company status is reserved for those issuers that seek
public capital in the securities markets or otherwise make their shares available
for secondary trading. But presumably this suggests that private issuer status be
limited to those situations where the bargaining over the allocation of capital to
the issuer gives us enough confidence that the price at which buyers are
attracted will be a fully informed one. An active trading market disconnected
from such bargaining, even among the sophisticated or wealthy, will not by
itself generate a socially optimal amount or type of information. If we trust the
SEC to set disclosure standards efficiently—a big “if” to many people, to be
sure—it makes sense to construe the public issuer definition expansively, which
means limiting any exception based on investor qualification to situations where
we expect private bargaining to adequately protect not only initial but also
after-market buyers in a sufficiently robust trading market.
Against this background, we understand better how Congress ultimately
resolved this issue in the JOBS Act. As noted earlier, the number of record
shareholders is increased to 2,000 but only if there are no more than 499
nonaccredited investors (not including employees).121 This is a bow to the idea
that such investors should protect themselves in terms of information rights, but
the number of shareholders is then capped at 1,999, so that the idea cannot be
taken to the extreme of an unlimited “sophisticated” shareholder base that never
triggers 1934 Act registration. Once again, however, that simply brings us back
to how record shareholders are counted and the shakiness of tolerating formal-
ism so easily subject to manipulation unless regulators are carefully on guard.122
120. See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
121. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-06, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(g)(1)(A)).
122. We leave to the side Congress’s other innovation here, which is to say that shareholders
obtained via the crowd-funding exemption in new section 4(6) of the 1933 Act are not counted for
purposes of 1934 Act registration under section 12(g). See id. § 302, 126 Stat. 315. This is bound up in
the extraordinarily deregulatory thrust of section 4(6), which to us is the most aggressive feature of the
JOBS Act but outside the scope of this Article. This connection between crowd funding and section
12(g) is fraught with ambiguity, as crowd-funded issuers will have to struggle with what it means for
the shareholder to have “purchase[d] such securities in transactions described under section 4(6).”
Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). Does this also include
downstream purchasers of those securities? What if those securities are exchanged for new ones?
Suffice it to say for now, that nothing in the foregoing discussion would offer a principled basis for the
crowd-funding exemption and its collateral effects. This is a pure trade-off of investor protection in the
hope of job creation.
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2. Setting the Threshold: A Cost–Benefit Challenge
Putting aside the point that record shareholders is a foolish number to count
in the first place, how would we know whether a change in the size threshold
was good or bad policy? Our aim in this section is to describe how best to
assess the costs and benefits with any such steps—the tools that can help, or not.
To be clear at the outset, we are skeptical that formal cost–benefit analysis can
generate confident policy prescriptions. At the same time, policy makers should
be as open as possible to considering the full range of possible costs and
benefits, and economic analysis has much to contribute. We would support a
greater formalization of the prominence of economists at the SEC and do not
want any of our impressions about the limitations of such analysis, or the
inevitably political nature of the regulatory task, to suggest otherwise. There is
some irony here that for all of the insistence by some in Congress about the
need for more rigorous cost–benefit analysis, Congress prepared nothing of the
sort before adopting the JOBS Act.
Disclosure required by the SEC provides some numerical data (although just
an approximation and not by reference to beneficial ownership) with which to
work to identify how many companies would be in the range under consider-
ation and from which we could also learn about other financial and structural
attributes.123 But even this would be of limited help because, presumably, the
target group about which we would like to know are companies that had chosen
to stay under the 500-shareholder threshold until they were ready for an IPO or
similar event, thereby jumping quickly to a large number of shareholders (with
an exchange listing that makes counting unimportant).
So what could we know about the consequences of taking such a group out of
the registration requirement or—more importantly—giving emerging compa-
nies in the future the ability to increase their shareholder base without triggering
registration? The benefits of requiring registration depend on an estimation of
how much secondary trading there is likely to be; we would also need to know
who is likely to be trading in this enhanced secondary market, how information
sensitive they are, etc. Disclosure can also reduce agency costs, making self-
123. 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(b)(1) (2011). As a point of reference, John Coates provides data that the
median record shareholder count for a large sample of public companies (Compustat) is just 700. See
Examining Investor Risk in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of John C. Coates
IV, Prof. of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School). Based on 2011 data, a SEC staff report found
that only thirteen percent of companies registered under section 12(g) (318 of 2,524 for which data was
available for the number of shareholders of record) would be required to initially register with the
Commission under the new section 12(g) threshold. See SEC, AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE, supra note 96, at
26. That report likely understates the number of companies because use of street-name registration,
which brings down the number of record holders as measured in the data, typically occurs after a
company goes public and becomes subject to the 1934 Act. See DEPOSITORY TRUST CO., supra note 87, at
12. Nevertheless, the change in the section 12(g) threshold seems certain to reduce the number of
companies required to register because of section 12(g), a question the SEC report did not address.
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dealing less likely and facilitating greater investor influence.124 And of course
there are the positive externalities of disclosure in terms of product market
competition and whatever else we deem desirable about public status.125 Simply
by way of recent example, public status will now trigger “conflict mineral”
disclosure—Congress’s view that it is desirable for public companies to investi-
gate and report (at considerable cost, apparently) on the extent to which their
products incorporate tainted African minerals.126 Without expressing any opin-
ion about the relative costs and benefits of this particular initiative, that desired
transparency is gained or lost from some number of companies depending on
where we set the threshold. There are many other possible examples on which
we elaborate more in Part III.
On the cost side, the direct costs are the marginal costs in time, manpower,
and professional service fees associated with public company registration respon-
sibilities over and above what is currently being spent or would be spent to meet
obligations associated with, say, alternative forms of financing for the issuer’s
capital needs. These weigh heavily on smaller firms and may introduce agency
cost problems if accountants’ or lawyers’ advice tends toward the self-serving
(as apparently happened in the aftermath of Sarbanes–Oxley).127 Just as impor-
tant are indirect costs. Threat to corporate secrecy is a well-known externality,
albeit one with both positive and negative aspects. Disclosure does promote
competition by helping identify businesses that are earning supra-normal re-
turns; on the other hand, too extensive or premature disclosure of competitive
plans, research, and development diminish the value of preferred business
strategies and, at the margin, may deter investment in the first place—a concern
the SEC has tried to address in Reg S-K but which remains potentially trou-
bling.128 Disclosure of bad news can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, espe-
cially to companies struggling to grow.
There are effects on management associated with public transparency. The
best known are the opportunity costs in terms of the time and attention that
executives and board members spend on compliance as opposed to growing the
business. Interesting research has shown that reporting can distort real economic
124. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047, 1048–49 (1995).
125. See, e.g., Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Markets:
Theory and a Case from the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
439 (2006) (examining the effects of accounting fraud on the product market); J. Gregory Sidak, The
Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American Telecommunications
After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 235 (2003) (estimating WorldCom’s misreporting caused
more than $7 billion in harm to other telecommunications providers and frustrated key elements of
national telecommunications policy).
126. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502,
124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)).
127. Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817,
1854 (2007) (discussing rent seeking by lawyers, accountants, and others).
128. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763
(1995).
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choices—for instance, projects foregone because of accounting uncertainties or
consequences.129 It is entirely plausible that public reporting responsibilities, in
general, dampen the inclination to take risk.
Aggregating and netting out all these possible benefits and costs is impos-
sible, of course—which makes something like choosing the threshold for public
company status a work of political impressionism. But if that is all we have to
say here, we have not been particularly helpful because anyone who has had a
hand in crafting securities law knows that much already.
Indeterminacy notwithstanding, we do have some data points. Of most
relevance—because it was specifically motivated by moves to tweak the 500-
shareholder threshold—is work by Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, who study the
firms that, in unusually large numbers, went dark in the time period after
Sarbanes–Oxley.130 They document significant abnormal negative returns when
firms voluntarily moved to the Pink Sheets, consistent with investors valuing
the information now lost. But this leaves two motivational possibilities. One, an
agency cost story, is that managers prefer the private benefits of control
threatened by Sarbanes–Oxley’s enhanced regulation.131 Alternatively, this is a
value-based decision, reflecting the increased costs of compliance for smaller
firms whose growth prospects (and hence future public capital needs) are
poor—the negative returns explained by the going dark signal, which communi-
cates to investors that the firm is indeed facing a bleak future. The authors find
support for both propositions. The agency cost explanation dominates when
corporate governance and other investor protections are weak.132 Otherwise, the
results are consistent with smaller firms that have limited growth opportunities,
129. See Leonce L. Bargeron et al., Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON.
34 (2012); Daniel A. Cohen et al., Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods, 83 ACCT. REV. 757 (2008).
130. Christian Leuz et al., When Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of
Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J. ACCT. & ECON. 181, 183 (2008). For analysis in a similar vein
with similar results, see Andra´s Marosi & Nadia Massoud, Why Do Firms Go Dark?, 42 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 421, 436–38 (2007). For further analysis of some of this data, see Fried, supra
note 99, at 151–52. Fried notes, for example, that the vast majority of smaller firms that went dark
provided absolutely no disclosure to shareholders. Id. It is important to note a striking asymmetry
between the obligation to register as a public company under section 12(g) after the JOBS Act and the
ability to deregister. Although the former number grew to 2,000, the threshold for going dark remained
at 300 (except for banks and bank holding companies). As a result, the JOBS Act cannot be said to
increase the “going dark” risk but rather is directed at prepublic issuers.
131. Private benefits of control are those forms of insider enrichment made possible by the absence
of transparency and are thus seen as inversely related to the degree of required disclosure and its related
legal requirements. See, e.g., Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the
Cross-listing Decision, 64 J. FIN. 425, 450 (2009).
132. Firms going dark are more likely to face financial distress and a deteriorating trading environ-
ment, which they take as evidence that these firms are making a rational cost–benefit calculation. Leuz
et al., supra note 130. But there is also evidence that going dark firms have weaker governance and
outside monitoring and greater free cash flow and voluntary accounting accruals, which is consistent
with the agency cost hypothesis. In addition, firms that go dark tend not to provide even inexpensive
voluntary disclosures. Their inference, then, is that both of these explanations are at work, with the
weaknesses in governance associated with a greater likelihood of a “private benefits” motivation.
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reasonably concluding that the regulatory costs exceed the benefit to investors—
evidence that the costs associated with registration can be prohibitively high for
some smaller firms.
Earlier work by Bushee and Leuz offers another useful glimpse.133 They
study the 1999 rule change that required all OTC Bulletin Board companies to
adhere to SEC reporting rules, a move that would make a firm’s decision to be
on the Bulletin Board as also a choice to voluntarily submit to regulatory
disclosure, even if below the section 12(g) threshold. Most firms responded by
dropping to the Pink Sheets, while others chose to remain and become compli-
ant; a third subset was already compliant because of section 12(g).134 The
authors interpret the results for the first two groups—the decision of the first
group to avoid the new obligation and the lower abnormal return around the
announcement dates that they find for the second group—as evidence that
expected registration costs exceeded expected benefits. On the other hand,
liquidity was enhanced for all firms remaining on the Bulletin Board, and
already compliant firms received a boost in returns, which suggests the presence
of positive externalities from the reformed institutional structure of the mar-
ket.135
What does this tell us? It is broadly consistent with the presence of significant
investor protection benefits even at the small firm level, but with costs that, for
firms with minimal growth prospects that would require public financing at
least, create on balance a negative value proposition.136 But note that this tells
us little about the category of firms (like Facebook), whose motivation would be
to delay the transparency associated with public status but who might benefit
from enhanced liquidity associated with a higher section 12(g) threshold. We
doubt that there is much of an agency cost story to be told for most such firms,
especially those anxious to buy some extra private time, but still grow, prior to a
significant liquidity event like an IPO,137 but the evidence does not speak one
way or the other.
There are other data points of use, although none particularly more helpful.
Allen Ferrell’s study of section 12(g)’s adoption in 1964 suggests that the
133. Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation:
Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233 (2005).
134. Id. at 235 (noting that seventy-six percent of OTCBB firms not previously filing with the SEC
chose not to meet the new disclosure requirements and thus were removed from OTCBB).
135. Id. at 235–36.
136. This, in turn, is consistent with the fairly widespread sense among commentators that compli-
ance costs are unnecessarily burdensome for smaller issuers, especially after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 232
(2009). For a discussion of the challenges associated with evaluating such claims, see Ehud Kamar et
al., Sarbanes-Oxley’s Effects on Small Firms: What Is the Evidence?, in IN THE NAME OF ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP? THE LOGIC AND EFFECTS OF SPECIAL REGULATORY TREATMENT FOR SMALL BUSINESS 143, 164 (Susan M.
Gates & Kristin J. Leuschner eds., 2007); see also supra notes 127–29.
137. Because these firms will undergo the obligations of public status under both the 1933 and 1934
Acts soon enough and are dealing with private capital from relatively sophisticated sources, there seems
to be less opportunity or incentive to cheat in the period of time just before the IPO.
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movement of so many OTC stocks to registrant status both reduced volatility
and generated abnormal positive returns—consistent with enhanced stock price
accuracy.138 But this shift included many quite large issuers that had chosen to
avoid exchange listings and cannot necessarily be taken as strong evidence at
the margins of registration. There are a rapidly increasing number of empirical
studies on the benefits of specific changes (or clusters of changes) to SEC
disclosure requirements.139 Because of the greater data availability and statisti-
cal power when focusing on widely traded securities, these studies usually tell
us more about consequences with respect to larger issuers.140 Many of these
studies support the intuition that mandatory disclosure has positive payoffs, but
even at that level, most would conclude that we are far from being able
confidently to assess the social welfare effects of financial reporting obligations
generally on any category of issuer.
All this suggests to us a range of reasonableness for setting the threshold
(based on market cap, public float, or number of shareholders) without setting
off loud public-interest alarms; within that range, we can tolerate outcomes
based on intuitions and subjective (including ideological) preferences for more
or less regulation. We would add to this the effect of any change on SEC
resources, which usually favors a restricted scope to regulation in close cases,
so as to free up precious resources for other work. Based on all of this, we think
there was a good case to be made for moving to a higher threshold, with an
exemption for issuers with qualified shareholders beyond 500, measured by
beneficial, not record, ownership, although not—for the reasons stated earlier
about active aftermarkets141—to an unlimited number.
In that sense, the direction of the JOBS Act section 12(g) reform should not
be judged too harshly. The JOBS Act encourages the development of trading
sites, like SharesPost and SecondMarket, which are open only to accredited
investors and, in that sense, might well set in motion a new round of market
building closed off to public retail investors. What is most bothersome, of
course, is that the metric remains record ownership, which is rendered useless
so long as simple bundling mechanisms are permitted to flourish.
What does not make sense is to continue the facade of a third threshold based
on size when it has little practical effect. A threshold of 2,000 record sharehold-
ers, excluding employees and crowd-funding investors, is not going to reach
many companies in today’s market before they seek a stock-exchange listing or
a registered public offering. Although we have noted how those two require-
ments are likely to be of reduced importance going forward given technological
and market changes, the greater use of street-name ownership and bundling of
138. Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter
Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 214 (2007).
139. For a literature review, see Beyer et al., supra note 108.
140. See Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New
Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 346–48 (2003).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 115–19.
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multiple investors within a single nominee is also likely to provide an easy way
around section 12(g) in such a world. We are already at a point where the
section 12(g) size requirement will seldom be a binding constraint in forcing a
company into the public status of the 1934 Act, and we may in the future find
ourselves where many more companies have a size and impact comparable to a
pre-2012 reporting company but can approach the 1934 Act obligations as a
voluntary choice.
The exercise we have just undertaken leads us to another insight, which we
will develop in the next Part. Public company status brings with it the cumula-
tive effect of hundreds of line-item disclosure requirements, statutory obliga-
tions, and corporate governance rules that demand a complex and costly
negotiation among executives, directors, accountants, and lawyers (if not IT
professionals, bankers, employees, and a host of other constituents as well). At
the section 12(g) threshold of public status, where the costs and benefits
probably run close together, even when each category is viewed capaciously, it
is best to impose on relatively smaller companies only those obligations that
clearly relate to core investor protection goals, not necessarily those that,
although articulated in terms of investor protection, are really the product of an
inchoate social and political intuition about publicness that is neither necessary
nor appropriate for smaller public companies. Securities regulation does this to
some extent already, but the distinctions are haphazard and under theorized. We
turn now to that task.
III. PUBLICNESS BEYOND MERELY INVESTOR METRICS, AND THE “ON RAMP”
The threshold question that we have just considered stresses how momentous
it is for a company to shift from private to public. Those companies take on a
host of obligations—not just the disclosure obligations that have always been a
central focus of the federal securities laws, but also regulation relating to
internal controls and a variety of corporate governance obligations imposed in
the years since 1934, particularly in the mammoth reforms of the Sarbanes–
Oxley and Dodd–Frank Acts. It is not surprising that many issuers would be
hesitant to make the jump.
That takes us to a second important reform in the JOBS Act—the “on ramp”
for emerging growth companies. This is a fairly complicated provision that says
that a list of 1934 Act obligations otherwise imposed on public companies will
not attach for five years after a company’s IPO unless the issuer either passes
$1 billion in annual revenues or reaches a certain high level of market capitaliza-
tion before that fifth anniversary.142 These delayed-onset provisions run the
gamut from auditor certification for the adequacy of the issuer’s internal
controls through executive compensation provisions like “say on pay” and
disclosure of the ratio between the pay of the CEO and that of the issuer’s
142. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012).
2013] 371“PUBLICNESS” IN CONTEMPORARY SECURITIES REGULATION
median employee.143
When we started our project, we had a similar intuition as to the burdens that
the growth of securities regulation was imposing on smaller companies, and
thus find ourselves sympathetic to the thrust of the on-ramp idea. Easing the
transition from private to public should encourage public offerings at the
margins and make the debate about the right metrics for publicness under
section 12 less consequential. Our sense, however, was that this was not just
about incentives with respect to issuer choice about crossing the public-private
divide. A separation between what is expected of smaller and emerging issuers
and what is expected of large established issuers makes sense for a more
profound set of reasons. As a result, in some ways the on-ramp reform does not
go as far as it could have or should have. On the other hand, the Act’s list of
what emerging growth companies can avoid seems something of a wish list for
issuers rather than a conceptually well-grounded set of exemptions. Our effort
here will be both to make the stronger case and suggest a more principled way
to think about the separation.
Why do we regulate the disclosure practices of public companies or impose
internal controls or governance provisions on them? The orthodox account is
that mandatory disclosure and its accompaniments correct for a potential market
failure in the socially optimal production of information and shed sunlight on
markets that otherwise would be easier candidates for fraud and manipula-
tion.144 Both of these explanations can be stated in investor protection terms as
well as in terms of lowering the cost of public capital available to issuers—an
efficiency-based story. Under this orthodoxy, we seek an optimal balance of the
costs and benefits of disclosure given the competing interests of suppliers and
users of capital (which might be internalized, in part, when the suppliers of
capital become “owners” of the firm).
But there are externalities to disclosure and its adjuncts that play a large
role in answering the question as well. Issuer-specific information and the
integrity of stock prices generate benefits for society in many different ways—
for example, in capital allocation among competing users, in promoting more
competitive product markets, in helping measure wealth for tax and similar
purposes, or to assist in the regulation of certain industries.145 Optimal disclo-
sure policy is never as simple as estimating whether investors would consider it
cost efficient, even if that may be an important thing to know.
Although the externalities issue is well-known and widely discussed, our
claim in this Part is that the extent to which—purely as a descriptive matter—
securities regulation is about social, political, and economic interests, in addi-
tion to investor protection and capital formation, has been seriously
143. Id. §§ 102–06, 126 Stat. at 308–12.
144. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP.
L. 1, 9 (1983).
145. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J.
997, 1005–06 (1992).
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underestimated. Even though we can find hints of this going back much further
in time,146 we are talking here about a fairly contemporary phenomenon. It is
probably safe to say that when Congress changed the definition of public status
in 1964, it was creating mandatory disclosure obligations for a broader class of
issuers but little else.
The transformation began in earnest in the 1970s in the aftermath of the
Watergate scandals. Most directly, this led to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977, where Congress reacted to the phenomenon of public companies
paying bribes to foreign officials, even if such actions promoted the issuer’s
competiveness or profitability.147 More recently, as discussed in the previous
section,148 Dodd–Frank imposed expensive information search and disclosure
obligations on companies that use “conflict minerals” or are covered by certain
mine safety rules.149
These are the easy illustrations, however, and might be seen as outliers. In
more subtle ways, societal interests intermingle with investor protection ratio-
nales, reaching deeply into the regulatory regime of the 1934 Act. A slightly
more textured example would be environmental disclosure. Environmental
compliance costs and climate change impacts can affect issuers in a material
way, making this fair game for mandatory disclosure.150 At the same time,
however, environmental disclosure can be designed to produce societal benefits,
and we strongly suspect that the motivation for action in this area cannot be
explained by investor needs alone. In the pages that follow, we will survey other
areas where we think the securities law responsibilities of public companies
have motivations and explanations not strictly confined to their contributions to
investor protection or capital formation.
To be sure, the expanding scope of securities regulation and its deep seepage
into corporate governance is a familiar theme, especially among conservative
critics of the growing federal presence.151 But we think that the debate has
missed the bigger picture of what has been happening and why. In our view,
securities regulation over the last four decades or so has been the joint project of
experimentation in investor protection coupled with a public-driven demand for
more transparency, voice, and accountability—that is, publicness as that term is
146. For a discussion, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
148. See supra text accompanying note 116.
149. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1502,
1503, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213, 2218 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p), 78m-2). The SEC has implemented
these provisions in Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, 2012 WL 3611799 (Aug. 22, 2012) (regarding
conflict minerals); Exchange Act Release No. 33-9286, 2011 WL 6415434 (Dec. 21, 2011) (regarding
mine safety).
150. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act
Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
151. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 109, at 2361.
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applied, for example, to the evolution of global administrative law152—as to
systemically significant business enterprises.
There are two implications to all this. The first has to do with the engineering
of securities law. If securities regulation were entirely (or almost entirely)
about finding the efficient sweet spot that melds investor needs with promoting
capital formation, the cost–benefit analysis would be a challenging but mean-
ingful exercise. There are boundaries to how benefits and costs play out, and
there are metrics to test investor reaction to regulatory changes from which we
can infer whether regulation is too costly. But once we start adding layers of
social and economic externalities (many of them highly complex and contin-
gent) the exercise starts unraveling. In principle, we have no objection to asking
any regulator to consider quite seriously the costs associated with any proposed
change, but the benefits of focused consideration on costs diminish when there
are potentially expansive and immeasurable social benefits. Cost–benefit analy-
sis as a formal exercise, then, might not do all that much good. In the end,
these are political choices, not simply economic ones. To the extent that these
motivations originate from Congress, moreover, strict judicial insistence on
paying attention to costs—to which the SEC has certainly been subjected
recently153—might interfere with law making entrusted to democratically elected
or appointed policy makers. Costs could exceed investor benefits and still be
politically legitimate.
But there is a more specific payoff to this exercise. We believe that nearly all
the examples of the melding of investor and broader social interests that have
changed the meaning of publicness are reactions to highly salient (usually
scandalous) events involving large public companies. The FCPA was a response
to foreign and domestic bribery allegations against more than four hundred
large companies;154 Sarbanes–Oxley was driven by the financial fraud at Enron
and WorldCom; Dodd–Frank targeted the seemingly heedless risk taking by
Lehman, Bear Stearns, and numerous other financial firms that survived only
with extraordinary governmental intervention.
If that is right, then it is fair to say that this amorphous cluster of public
law within securities regulation is meant for those companies with a large
public footprint. When Enron and WorldCom fell, for example, the failures
caused much damage to their shareholders and debt holders, to be sure. But the
fraud also caused immense pain to employees and retirees as well as billions of
dollars of losses to competitors and severe distortions in the regulated markets
in which they operated.155 These highly visible harms were surely part of
Congress’s implicit cost–benefit assessment in designing a response.
However, most public companies have no similar footprint. They have local
152. See supra note 7.
153. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down, as
arbitrary and capricious, the SEC’s proxy access rule).
154. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 449.
155. See Sidak, supra note 125.
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stakeholders, to be sure, but the ripple effects from fraud or wrongdoing are
contained; they are not systemically important businesses in the sense that their
wrongdoing or failure will be absorbed with relatively little public notice. Yet
precisely because they are public companies, they presumptively have the full
burden of—increasingly costly—public company regulation under the 1934
Act. This is not entirely so—there is some element of “tiering” in both the
statute and SEC rulemaking that lessens the burdens on smaller issuers.156 We
suggest a bolder move. We would create a distinct class of systemically
significant public issuers whose regulation would be separate from most other
issuers under the 1934 Act. These would be considered “public issuers.”
Publicly reactive regulation (and most of the inchoate social agenda) would
presumably be concentrated here, which would leave small and mid-cap compa-
nies—to which we would attach the label “reporting issuer”—free of the
unintended burdens of publicness, while preserving the core of investor protec-
tion and capital formation that should be the touchstone of securities regulation
in this domain. Were that to happen, in turn, some of the stress might be taken
off the section 12(g) question because the burden of moving from private to
public would be less.
Of course, measuring the footprint is hard as is deciding what part of
securities law is the investor protection core and what is public law supplementa-
tion. The remainder of this Part elaborates on why we think that contemporary
securities regulation is more of a “public law” subject than the orthodoxy
assumes and then takes on that latter question by looking for the places where
there may be a broader dimension to publicness than just protecting investors.
We then show how our separation of public issuers into two categories would
work and how this differs from what Congress has just done in the JOBS Act.
A. DISCLOSURE AND THE PURPOSES OF SECURITIES REGULATION
As we have seen, disclosure has long been the dominant thrust of federal
securities regulation, so that explanations for disclosure seem to define the reach
of regulation and the line between public and private. Mandatory disclosure is
required by the government, as the now orthodox argument has been made,
because information, if left to normal market forces, will be underproduced;
information is a public good with a nonexcludability characteristic.157 Manage-
156. For some time, the SEC has applied a less burdensome set of disclosure requirements on
smaller issuers, first defined by reference to revenue and public float below $25 million and more
recently at a $75 million float. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m), n(a) & (d) (2006). In determining where to place the
line for a scaled requirement, however, the SEC drew on long-standing 1933 Act lines as opposed to
developing any new theory. The SEC’s explanation—that the break point was intended “to include the
companies that are least likely to find such a change overly burdensome”—seemed to be little more
than practicality—“to use a preexisting threshold to reduce regulatory complexity” without consider-
ation of policy on which determinations of publicness obligations should be based. Acceleration of
Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website Access to Reports, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8089, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,896, 19,900 (Apr. 23, 2002).
157. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 118, at 286–87.
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ment of the issuer, who likely will have the greatest access to information, may
seek to withhold valuable information so as not to alert competitors of propri-
etary information; managers of individual companies might be willing to dis-
close such information but only if all others were required to do so.158 Such
mandatory disclosure can also overcome insufficient investment in standardiza-
tion and specialized language, given similar collective-action problems.159
Managers may also not disclose because they can benefit from the asymmetry
of information. Shareholders’ efforts to respond to such agency costs by manag-
ers will be limited by the collective-action problems of a large group taking the
necessary action. Even if those collective-action problems could be solved,
verification may be incomplete because such costs can suck up all the benefits
of division of labor upon which the public corporation has been based. To the
extent that multiple shareholders can and do seek to verify the same informa-
tion, the result will be to overproduce some information at the same time that
the overall amount of information may be underproduced.
Those arguments provide the conventional story for mandatory disclosure by
government with the focus on the impact on individual firms and its investors.
But the theoretical justification has also been grounded on benefits to all
citizens, not just investors. Merritt Fox has noted that acceptance of the efficient
market hypothesis means “the primary function of disclosure is . . . efficiency in
the real economy, not investor protection.”160 Jack Coffee has argued that
successfully reducing the costs of capital would produce macroeconomic ben-
efits for the entire society: mandatory disclosure is the lowest costs means of
correcting private markets’ failures to provide adequate securities research and
verification because it is a public good.161 As a result, Coffee says, “[o]nce we
recognize that there is a social interest associated with an allocatively efficient
capital market, then it is an overly narrow form of social cost accounting to
calculate only the costs to issuers and benefits to investors.”162
One specific context where the public or social benefits will exceed the
private benefits relates to risky deals in which the gains and losses of company
decisions are not felt symmetrically. In a pattern prominently featured in
analysis that followed the financial crisis, this can occur when the upside
benefits of the deal, if events turn out well, produce outsized gains for the
managers and the shareholders, but if the decision turns out badly, the diversi-
fied shareholder and officers who have received excessive compensation can
158. Id. at 290–91.
159. Id. at 303–04.
160. Fox, supra note 119, at 1415.
161. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for Mandatory Disclosure, 70 VA.
L. REV. 717, 722 (1984).
162. Id. at 737; see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 40, at 6 (noting that the goal of ensuring
accuracy of securities prices is “important, even apart from the goal of investor protection, because
capital markets allocate a scarce resource (capital) among competing users . . . [thereby] promot[ing]
efficiency and economic growth and thereby benefit[ing] all citizens, not simply investors,” and arguing
that public and social benefits of disclosure exceed private benefits of disclosure).
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walk away from a limited liability entity and the costs are borne by the taxpayer
providing deposit insurance or a government bailout.163 As occurred in the
aftermath to the financial meltdown, employees of such firms that experience
the negative impacts lose jobs, the unemployment rate rises, government rev-
enue drops and its safety-net expenditures increases, and, in a worst case
scenario, credit freezes up and economic activity stalls.164
American securities regulation reflects recurring efforts to prevent such
externalization and those efforts have grown over the last decade. Congress
included in the 1934 Act a detailed description of the necessity for regulation,
which specified “widespread unemployment and the dislocation of trade, trans-
portation, and industry” that required such great expense from Government “as
to burden the national credit.”165 Various New Deal iterations of social control
over finance reflect the benefits for the public as much or more than investor
benefits.166
The last two important securities reform laws illustrate this broader focus.
Sarbanes–Oxley reflects the “political instinct that the incentive structures in
modern public corporations generate risks that require public (not just investor)
accountability to be legitimate.”167 Section 404 of Sarbanes–Oxley enhances
auditing and financial reporting as too risky behavior; there is a ban on loans
providing too tempting an incentive structure for executives; independent di-
rectors are given special responsibility for promoting more transparency and
given additional functions that are likely to shift more of their role from solely
monitoring investor concerns to risks that unduly affect the larger society;168
and auditors and lawyers are drafted to help independent directors to perform
this public accountability function as gatekeepers, not only to protect investors,
but perhaps to serve the broader public purpose.
The learning of the financial crisis, as reflected in the provisions of Dodd–
Frank, seems to underline and highlight the earlier worry. Dodd–Frank doubles
down the focus on misaligned incentives and their adverse impact on the larger
economy. In executive compensation, for example, it imposes new requirements
on shareholder say on pay, requires claw backs from executives after financial
restatements, and mandates a greater role for independent directors on compen-
163. See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011) (discussing moral hazard in the banking context).
164. See generally Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial
Crisis, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 49 (2011) (discussing the job loss and recession that followed the onset of
the financial crisis).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1934).
166. See generally A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal
Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009) (describing social control over finance).
167. Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1820.
168. Id. at 1831 (“[I]ndependent directors are meant to be speed bumps for otherwise risky
behavior.”).
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sation committees.169 Requiring disclosure of a ratio between the CEO’s pay
and the median worker’s pay at the company seems to reflect concern for
stakeholders other than shareholders. Admittedly, more of Dodd–Frank’s re-
forms (capital requirements, resolution authority) are limited to entities in the
financial sector but illustrate a generic concern for externalization.
The externalization-based theory of securities regulation has not received as
much academic attention as traditional economic theories framed as investor
protection. The point is fairly simple. As public law scholars have been pointing
out for some time, there are certain norms of social legitimacy increasingly
placed not only on government actors, but on private institutions that exercise
substantial power and have the capacity to inflict considerable harm on soci-
ety.170 These norms include a reasonable degree of transparency, some level of
accountability, and an openness to external voices. We believe that any rule of
securities regulation that promotes any of these norms is likely to be motivated,
at least in part, by that inchoate sense of the public responsibility of “private”
institutions.
We are not the only ones to suggest something like this. Hillary Sale has said
recently: “The scrutiny comes from more than just shareholders—the traditional
governance partners. It comes from the media and Main Street. Publicness
results.”171 The core sense is that things like transparency, accountability, and
openness to external voices are expected of large American corporations. This is
the world more often populated by administrative and constitutional law and
political science, where the sovereign’s power, along with its monopoly powers
and ability to coerce, require such characteristics to legitimize the exercise of
power. Cary Coglianese analogizes corporations to government based on the
presence of power triggering a similar need for legitimacy and suggests a
movement in corporate America toward institutional features that typically have
been characteristics of government.172 He finds corporate governance as akin to
procedural legitimacy, which in the political realm is defined in terms of
democratic accountability with elections as its principal defining characteristic
along with separation of power, transparency, and rule of law. Government
regulation in the corporate realm is analogous to substantive legitimacy in the
political realm akin to what a constitution does. It says even a procedurally
legitimate board “cannot take actions that will pollute the environment, treat
their workers badly, or take money from investors.”173
There are, of course, obvious differences. Corporations do not typically have
169. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951–
52, 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900, 1904 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n-1, 78j-3, 78j-4).
170. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000);
see also supra note 9.
171. Sale, supra note 10, at 148.
172. See generally Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 159
(2007) (arguing that the parallels between state governance and corporate governance are growing).
173. Id. at 162.
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the power of coercion that governments have and monopolies in the corporate
realm are subject to government challenge. Corporations are subject to the
constraints of various private markets, including the ability to exit that does not
regularly happen in government given the monopoly powers of government
and the coercive characteristics already mentioned. Yet, the size of many
corporations gives them a power that can justify public concepts of legitimacy.
As evidenced by the financial crisis, overpowering management incentives and
the ability to externalize losses to others when risks turn out badly creates
something like a negative monopoly for an individual company over the larger
market that can create a similar need for legitimacy. We do not resolve here the
degree of explanatory power of this externalizing justification except to recog-
nize congressional decision to base some additional regulation on this source.
Where the size of the corporation, the large incentives to management, and the
interconnection of downside risks means that corporations will have an external-
izing effect beyond their own shareholders, government cares about using
independent directors to bring transparency for audiences beyond just sharehold-
ers and to let independent directors act as conduits as to matters that might put
some stakeholder groups at risk.174
B. TWO LEVELS OF PUBLICNESS
Our proposal would separate out the largest issuers (public issuers) for
full publicness treatment rather than just exempting the smallest. It is based on
an entirely different theory of why we regulate public companies than here-
tofore has been articulated for any “tiering” of issuers and would put a far larger
number in the residual category of “reporting issuers.” Hence, our break point
would be at a different end of the spectrum, reflecting the view that “big
footprint” issuers are the exception, not the norm. The current standard (embed-
ded in the JOBS Act’s on ramp and other securities law contexts) for the largest
issuers uses a $700-million-market capitalization test,175 which strikes us as
suitable enough for our purposes—the top 20% to 30% of all registered
companies.
As to the substance of disclosure in the two realms, we do not have the time
or space to go item by item through Reg S-K and other disclosure instructions
to decide what should apply to both and what applies only in the true public
174. See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1831.
175. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101(a), 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012) (referencing the definition
of “large accelerated filer” in Rule 12b-2). This is also the test for “well-known seasoned issuer” for
1933 Act purposes, and when that designation was adopted in 2005, the SEC estimated that it covered
approximately thirty percent of all public issuers and that the total market capitalization for such issuers
was approximately ninety-five percent of total equity market capitalization. See Securities Offering
Reform, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,727 (Aug. 3, 2005). In the SEC’s
2011 staff study relating to internal controls, the category of “large accelerated filer” included 18.4% of
public issuers. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC, STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON SECTION
404(b) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 FOR ISSUERS WITH A PUBLIC FLOAT BETWEEN $75 AND $250
MILLION, at 29–30 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/404bfloat-study.pdf.
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sphere. We have already noted a number of requirements that we are quite sure
were meant for large issuers (conflict minerals, some environmental disclo-
sures) but there are many more that, on reflection, belong only in the public
issuer category. The touchstone for what is meant for reporting companies alone
should be strict value relevance, that is, a tight connection between the infor-
mation and the process by which conventional fundamental investment analysis
is done. To be sure, this will not always be an easy separation to draw, as the
following two examples will show. The payoff for our approach is in the
separation itself—we expect that where the broader conception of publicness is
at work in producing regulation, it is less likely to spill over to companies that
are not in the top-tier public category.
1. Internal Controls
Government requirements for corporate internal controls over auditing pro-
cesses increased with SEC action in 1978, but Sarbanes–Oxley brought a new
specificity and a new visibility to this element of regulation.176 Section 404(a)
required management to maintain an adequate internal control structure with a
yearly assessment.177 Section 404(b), in turn, required the company’s auditor to
“attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management,” a task that
added considerable expense to public companies.178
This new requirement for internal controls produced the sharpest cleavage in
terms of differentiating public companies. The SEC initially gave smaller public
issuers additional time to come into compliance,179 and Dodd–Frank perma-
nently exempted smaller companies from the requirements of 404(b).180 Until
the further reform in the JOBS Act, the break point chosen for companies that
would remain subject to a higher level of internal controls was the $75 million
public float threshold from the prior rule making.181
This particular break point aside, we see internal controls as a good example
of a melding of investor and societal interests. Simply on investor protection
grounds, evidence supports the view that internal control improvements have
generated substantial benefits to investors but at fairly high costs. These costs
176. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006); id. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (requiring public companies to
“devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assur-
ances that transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization”
and “as necessary . . . to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles”).
177. Id. § 7262(a).
178. Id. § 7262(b).
179. See, e.g., Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification
of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 49,313, 69 Fed. Reg. 9722,
9722 (Mar. 1, 2004).
180. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989G(a),
124 Stat. 1376, 1948 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(c)).
181. Id. (“Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to any audit report prepared for an issuer that is
neither a ‘large accelerated filer’ nor an ‘accelerated filer’ as those terms are defined in Rule 12b–2 of
the Commission (17 C.F.R. 240.12b–2).”).
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diminish in relation to those benefits as the size of the issuer grows larger. This
suggests that Congress had Enron and WorldCom firmly in mind, so that
internal controls have a public (in addition to investor) purpose. The story is not
hard to tell. The cluster of internal control rules try to mandate the involvement
of outside auditors, lawyers, and independent directors more deeply inside the
ordinary business operations of the firm as an attempt to loosen the autonomy of
management over the company’s core operations, including its ability to deter-
mine in secret how much risk to take on. The financial crisis has taught that this
hope may have been in vain, at least at highly complex banking and quasi-
banking institutions, but that does not diminish the obvious intrusion into
managerial prerogative occasioned by the rules. Indeed, the governance reforms
taken in Dodd–Frank just push on this harder.
That said, it does seem clear enough that internal controls (including auditor
certification) have some value relevance. A Dodd–Frank generated special study
by the SEC staff looked at the economic consequences and academic literature
on the role of internal controls for smaller companies above the $75 million
threshold and concluded that the case for keeping the Sarbanes–Oxley standards
for that category of issuers was stronger than the case for relaxing them.182 It
seems intuitive enough that internal controls are a healthy discipline for smaller
issuers—and that investors consider information about material weaknesses of
the sort generated by this discipline valuable—but the question is at what cost
(with costs understood broadly, as described above).183 We regard this as a close
call that could go either way on narrow investor protection grounds but do not
think that investors would be seriously threatened by limiting auditors’ review
of internal control procedures to truly public companies. The investor capital at
risk with respect to material weaknesses in internal controls is heavily concen-
trated among large issuers.184
2. Governance
If the political instinct in securities law reform over the past few decades
182. See SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 175, at 112. This issue was complicated when the SEC and
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) changed the interpretation of the internal
controls requirement in 2007 in a fairly issuer friendly way, which significantly changed the cost–
benefit calculus from before. For a study of the earlier period concluding that, “[o]n net, [Sarbanes–
Oxley] compliance reduced the market value of small firms,” see Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section
404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices, 65 J. Fin. 1163, 1163 (2010).
183. A separate study by SEC staff of issuer perceptions of the costs and benefits of section 404
notes a significantly more negative perception by managers of smaller firms as to the net of costs and
benefits than among larger issuers. See Cindy Alexander et al., The Economic Effects of SOX Section
404 Compliance: A Corporate Insider Perspective 22, 27 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Financial Intermediation Research Society), available at http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/FIRS/PDF/
2010/1608.pdf.
184. See Cindy R. Alexander & Kathleen Weiss Hanley, Regulatory Monitoring Under the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act 25 (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1022161
(finding that “the potential economic capital at risk of a disclosure of a material weakness in [a] large
compan[y] is 11 times greater than in a smaller company”).
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includes the desire to open up private control over socially important busi-
nesses, the “creep” in federal corporate governance found in Sarbanes–Oxley
and Dodd–Frank is surely an expression of that instinct. For example, both laws
imposed broad new roles on independent directors, roles that take them beyond
their traditional role of looking out for shareholder interests. In Sarbanes-Oxley,
the focus was the audit committee, requiring independent members with at least
one financial expert. Dodd–Frank requires independence for compensation
committee members.185 Both of these requirements turn on exchange listing, a
subset of public companies, and the threshold for the original 1934 Act.186
Directors’ and officers’ roles have not been a typical subject of federal law,
which leaves the core boundaries of duties and procedures to laws provided by
the states.187 When Congress did act, it chose to focus on defining director
duties in a way that would address the public impact of corporate decisions
more than the investor impact. Now we see new federal efforts to regulate
officer conduct, particularly to restrain misaligned incentives of officers leading
to decisions that visited harm on employees, consumers, and others outside the
corporation.188
Enhancement of shareholder governance had not been part of the reforms of
Sarbanes–Oxley, suggesting less of a direct concern about the need to protect
investor rights.189 They returned in Dodd–Frank via authorization of proxy
access for shareholders to nominate candidates for board of directors and
advisory shareholder votes on compensation. Notably, these are parts of the
shareholder process that have been most of interest to institutional shareholders
and particularly the subset of institutional shareholders made up of public
employee pension funds and union pension funds, the portion of the shareholder
census that is most open to concerns of the impact of corporations beyond the
corporation’s internal boundaries. The new whistleblower rules also seem de-
signed to cut open the corporation to expose wrongdoing, in ways that have
seriously antagonized corporate managers.
The obvious criticism of characterizing the federal governance reforms in this
way is that there is, as yet, little evidence of observable payoff in terms of either
shareholder or stakeholder interests. Proxy access might be a way of moderating
the risk preferences of company insiders who otherwise have control over the
election process, for example, but that requires the assumption that sharehold-
ers’ nomination and voting preferences will display greater risk aversion. In
185. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952,
124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3).
186. See supra Part I.
187. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2003).
188. See supra text accompanying note 142; see also JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101–106,
126 Stat. 306 (2012).
189. Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1829 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley’s failure to empower sharehold-
ers suggests that the act was not intended to address classic agency cost problems but was meant to
create more public accountability).
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fact, as Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter have shown, shareholders are likely to
be cheerleaders for risky behavior, especially during boom times.190 It is hard to
find dramatic results from increased independent director involvement on audit
and other key committees, although there is some evidence linking indepen-
dence (especially when the directors are trained in accounting or law) to greater
conservatism in financial reporting.191
But our claim here does not depend on the success of the intervention in
serving social ends. We concede that these may be emotional, expressive, or
purely political moves by Congress, although our impression is that they
have—combined with other social forces affecting large businesses—lessened
the free exercise of private managerial power inside public companies. And
these can be costly interventions, so that we can hardly be sure that the
cost–benefit trade-off is necessarily favorable when the benefits are so diffuse.
But that is precisely our point: we cannot deny the democratic legitimacy of
subjecting private institutions to greater public transparency, but we do hope to
focus this attention on the largest of companies whose footprints are substantial
and separate off those public companies with smaller footprints that are most at
risk from costly interventions without offsetting social benefits.
C. CONTRASTING THE “ON RAMP”
Our proposal would have a permanent separation of the two classes of
issuers, public and reporting, with firms crossing from one category to another
based on a fairly simple metric of market capitalization. We suspect that the
differences between what is required of merely reporting companies would be
significantly (and justifiably) less than what is required of public companies.
This gives us the opportunity to compare and contrast the on-ramp innovation
of the JOBS Act, which puts a temporal dimension to this separation, allowing
issuers as much as a five-year break from full 1934 Act regulation after their
IPO unless they hit a high revenue or market capitalization threshold before that
anniversary. On the other hand, the list of privileges associated with on-ramp
status is fairly small in contrast to what we envision. To us, it is little more than
a list of items managers of emerging growth companies find discouraging, with
the hope that taking them away will make it somewhat less bothersome to make
a public offering. Congress could have made a much bolder statement by
following our proposal.
Does it make sense to introduce a temporal dimension to 1934 obligations?
We see some point to connecting how recent the IPO was to the issuer’s size.
Because such a company will almost always be going through the rite of
passage of an IPO, there is an alternative discipline of SEC review and a more
190. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011).
191. Jayanthi Krishnan et al., Legal Expertise on Corporate Audit Committees and Financial
Reporting Quality, 86 ACCT. REV. 2099, 2103 n.5, 2126–27 (2011).
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intensive liability regime to which it will recently have been subject. In addi-
tion, we suspect that some of the pathologies that require strong disclosure and
governance interventions are associated with issuer age—firms acquire bad
habits in terms of things like internal controls and executive compensation over
time, in ways that are different in companies still in the fast-growth stage
following their IPO. On the other hand, precisely because the immediate
post-IPO period is characterized by rapid growth, the change itself may intro-
duce stresses that suggest the need for special caution.
Having said all this, it should be emphasized that the exercise leading to the
on ramp in the JOBS Act was not a rigorous assessment of the relative costs and
benefits to investors of the list of rules to which emerging growth companies
would not be subjected. It was instead presented simply as a set of incentives to
go public. The test for whether this was good public policy will come only to
the extent that entrepreneurship is encouraged and jobs created—on which we
are skeptically agnostic—in ways that outweigh any harm to investors from the
regulation that disappears.
CONCLUSION: OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE REGULATORY PROCESS
Our inquiries into the various issues put in play by the Facebook problem
reflect the fact that these boundary issues along the public–private divide are
under theorized and, up until recently, left to resolution by reference to regula-
tory legacies from a time far different from today’s trading markets. The JOBS
Act has no theoretical coherence either—it is a bundle of changes united simply
by the hope that they will promote capital formation and create jobs—and so
this effort to bring more rigor to the publicness question remains important. We
have tried to sort out what regulatory objectives are of enduring value in the
context of technology-driven markets from what no longer makes much sense.
But we mapped this area for another reason. While statutory law, rule
making, and enforcement capture most of the attention, most of securities
regulation happens through less formal channels—staff judgments expressed
through negotiations over transactional filings (word of which gets out), staff
pronouncements, “telephone interpretations,” no-action letters, and the like.192
With respect to our subject, this takes place within one division of the SEC,
Corporation Finance, and without much, if any, involvement by the Commission-
ers themselves. It is generally outside the purview of what we would formally
call administrative law.193 The obvious example here is the tolerance—
intentionally or not—of widespread bundling and other mechanisms that made a
192. See Cox et al., supra note 18, at 12–13. On the motivations behind these informal processes,
see Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of
Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591 (2006).
193. The failure of administrative law to address adequately what agencies do not do as well as what
they formally do is well recognized. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1684–85 (2004).
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mockery of section 12(g) long before the Facebook problem burst out of these
back channels into the political and legislative process. By and large, issues like
the ones we have addressed along the public–private divide are handled infor-
mally by the SEC staff. After an initial round of rule makings under the JOBS
Act, its implementation will be informal as well.
Informal regulation is usually reactive, which ties back to our interest in
marketplace technology and innovation. As innovation occurs, new spaces open
rapidly, and the question of what regulation applies will often not easily be
answered. Nimble lawyers and their clients will quickly claim—and maybe go
ahead and occupy—these spaces as involving low-intensity regulation. Some-
times they will quietly clear this occupation with the SEC staff in advance and
sometimes they just move in, waiting to see if there is push back. In turn,
sometimes the staff acquiesces (perhaps with conditions or stipulations), while
other times it simply does nothing.194 If no barriers appear, the movers claim
their interpretation as good law and pack more and more deals into that space.
Over time, the space can become densely occupied and a way of doing business.
By the time Facebook and others were able to take advantage of the fast-
growing marketplaces for private share trading, for example, established prac-
tice was on their side, even if the law was still murky.
Sooner or later, the staff and others may realize that there are problems. But
the regulatory dynamic is now different. The Commissioners and staff may be
reluctant to acknowledge publicly that their earlier inaction may have contrib-
uted to the problems, which may make it harder to address them candidly. More
importantly, once the space is heavily and profitably occupied, the occupants
will use whatever political resources are at their disposal to hold onto it. They
will cry about the costs and burdens of upsetting established transactional
routines. Although reforms may well occur, they are likely to be less than what
the Commission would have done ex ante.
This kind of reactive, informal regulation has both advantages and disadvan-
tages—we do not necessarily mean to be critical here. As is the goal of much
“new governance” theory, this style of regulation is incremental and experimen-
tal and, hence, fairly flexible.195 That is a tremendous virtue when the costs and
benefits associated with some innovation are ambiguous, as they frequently are.
Real empirical data can be generated to aid in further consideration. Moreover,
the informality and opaqueness of the regulatory action or inaction may insulate
it to some degree from the political posturing and bargaining that occurs with
legislation and formal administrative rule making. John Coates has written
about how quiet flexibility contributes significantly to the success of U.S.
194. This can be the product of deliberate choice, lack of information, cognitive limitations, or some
combination of the three. On the latter, see Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics
and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21–36 (2003); Langevoort, supra note 192, at 1608–12.
195. See, e.g., Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6–11 (2008).
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securities regulation.196
But the success of any such informality is highly contingent. It requires a
motivated SEC staff, reasonably prompt awareness of the nature of the innova-
tions, the resources to find out what is not known, and enough sophistication
to bargain hard with the fast movers. When political winds change frequently,
other priorities call, and top staff come and go, we cannot always count on
these. The connection between the technology-driven pace of innovation and
this style of regulation then becomes a significant concern. As that pace
accelerates, more and more spaces open up for potential occupation.
We stress this because we have some unease with what certain of the JOBS
Act reforms are likely to set in motion. As we have noted, for example, the
section 12(g) change from 500 record shareholders to 2,000 may not mean all
that much so long as exchange-based listings are normal for issuers seeking
liquidity for their shares. But the stealth growth of alternative markets for
“private” and smaller issuers and the creative ways that shareholdings can be
fashioned in high-tech settings, coupled with the global fragmentation of trading
across the board for all kinds of issuers, raises the distinct possibility that, in a
few years from now, listings will not be an obvious preference for many issuers.
If that happens, the JOBS Act reform will be seen in an entirely different light.
How well the public interest will be served by the interplay between opportunis-
tic innovation and reactive informal regulation remains to be seen. But, without
more stable funding and support for the work of the SEC, we worry that this
will be an increasingly one-sided sequence of negotiations. Although the politi-
cal battles over the Commission’s resources have many dimensions, we fear that
some of the motivation for keeping the agency partially starved is to assure
precisely that outcome.
196. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531 (2001).
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